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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE
Abstract: This paper studies menu choice problems in which the decision maker faces no ex ante un-
certainty about her ex post preferences, yet nevertheless exhibits non-trivial menu preferences due to the
presence of self-control problems. We introduce a new class of utilities which generalize the Gul-Pesendorfer
(2001, 2005) `No Self-Control' model. The main results in the paper provide utility representation theorems
for this class of utilities.
1 Introduction
Recall the canonical menu choice environment as ¯rst laid out in Kreps (1979). There are
(implicitly) two periods, termed an ex ante and ex post phase. In the ex ante phase the
objects of choice are collections (or menus) of period 2 consumption items. In the ex post
phase, the domain of choice is the set of objects contained in the menu selected in the
preceding period. This is a non-trivial choice problem for two reasons. First, the DM may
face uncertainty about her ex post consumption preferences at the point of menu selection.
Second, some ex post preferences may be viewed as harmful ex ante in which case the DM
prefers to select a menu that minimizes the impact of these `bad' preferences. Taking ¯rst
period choice as the only observable, the goal of papers in this literature is to characterize
models of menu choice that explain ¯rst period behavior using the subjective second period
preferences that are derived from data on ¯rst period choices.
For example, the main result in Kreps (1979) axiomatizes the following decision model:
U(A) :=
X
s2S
maxx2A us(x)
The ingredients of this utility function are as follows: (i) a state space S that indexes
the set of ex post consumption preferences, and (ii) a collection of ex post consumption
utilities, us(¢) : X ! R. Preferences represented by such a utility function are referred to
as `Preference for Flexibility.' Note that in the absence of uncertainty, by which we mean
that the DM knows with certainty what her ex post consumption preferences will be, the
above utility model reduces to the trivial model
U(A) = maxx2A u(x)
1The current draft is very preliminary. In particular, it does not contain a proper discussion of
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1Thus, in the °exibility setting there is nothing interesting to say unless the DM faces ex
ante uncertainty. However, the situation changes when we consider preferences where the
DM does not exhibit a desire for °exibility. For example, consider preferences that satisfy
the following condition:
Axiom T : Foreverymenu A there is some x 2 A such that Anx is weakly preferred to A
Following Gul-Pesendorfer (2001) (hereafter, GP), preferences that satisfy the above prop-
erty will be called `Temptation Preferences' and a DM who exhibits such preferences will
be said to have a `self-control problem.' A DM with a self-control problem must address
two countervailing concerns in the menu selection process. First, there might be ex ante
uncertainty about ex post preferences. Second, some of the realizable ex post preferences
may be viewed as harmful from an ex ante perspective. An example of a menu utility that
addresses both these problems is the GP (2001) utility:
U(A) = maxx2A u(x) ¡ maxx2A v(x)
This model has been generalized and axiomatized in (resp.) Dekel, et al. (2008) (hereafter,
DLR), Stovall (2008):
U(A) =
n X
k=1
qk¢(maxx2A (u(x) + vk(x)) ¡ maxx2A vk(x))
Observe that the above models all fall under the following expected utility paradigm:
U(A) =
X
s2S
p(s)¢maxx2A us(x)
where p(¢) : S ! [¡1;1] is a signed measure. In the case where p(s) is negative for some
s, these models characterize menu choice where uncertainty over ex post preferences and
self-control problems exist simultaneously.
Notice that the question \Does the DM face ex ante uncertainty about ex post prefer-
ences?" is conceptually distinct from asking \Does the DM have a self-control problem?"
Nevertheless, using the expected utility model the only way to represent a self-control prob-
lem is to simultaneously admit uncertainty over ex post preferences (i.e. jSj > 1). Thus,
the expected utility model con°ates these two issues.2 The purpose of this paper is to
provide a theory of temptation that decouples these issues and delivers a model of pure
self-control, where the DM behaves as if there is no uncertainty about ex post preferences.
The model we present is not the ¯rst no-uncertainty model in the decision theory literature
on temptation preference. In a follow-up to their (2001) paper, GP (2005) axiomatize what
they call the `Strotz model' of self-control given by the following utility: (let v : X ! R
and put Av := arg maxx2A v(x))
U(A) = maxx2Av u(x)
2With the exception of the trivial examples, U(A) = maxx2A u(x) and U(A) = minx2A u(x) which are
contained in the expected utility model.
2As we will soon see, the Strotz model ¯ts our de¯nition of a model of temptation without
uncertainty. However, it cannot accommodate two important aspects of self-control prob-
lems. The ¯rst of these is what we call \the aggregation problem" and the second is termed
\the multi-dimensional problem."3 To illustrate these two issues we ¯rst introduce some
notation. Say that x !t y if u(x) > u(y) (i.e. the (ex ante) normative value of the single-
ton fxg exceeds that of y) and fx;yg » fyg. Similarly, de¯ne x 6!t y as :(x !t y). The
notation \!t" should be interpreted in words as \is tempted by." Consider the following
two examples:
1. (temptation aggregation) x 6!t y;x 6!t z, fxg Â fx;y;zg.
2. (multi-dimensional temptation) x Â y Â z, x 6!t y;x !t z; and y 6!t z.
In the ¯rst example, the normatively superior element is individually tempted by neither y
nor z, but when both are present at the same time the DM faces a self-control problem.
The rationale for the `multi-dimensional' name is a little more involved. To motivate the
example, we ¯rst check that it does not admit a Strotz representation. To see this, observe
that the class of Strotz models (u(¢);v(¢)) where U(A) = maxx2Av u(x) is equivalent to the
class of pairs (u(¢);v(¢)) where we take v(¢) to be strict (i.e. the two classes represent the
same set of preferences). Thus, it su±ces to check there is no Strotz representation where
the v(¢) utility is strict. To see this note that (i) x 6!t y implies that v(x) > v(y), (ii)
x !t z implies v(z) > v(x), and (iii) y 6!t z implies v(y) > v(z). Put together we obtain
v(x) > v(y) > v(z) > v(x) - contradiction. Note that in order to modify this preference
so that it admits a Strotz representation we would need either (i) y !t z (and x 6!t y)
or (ii) x !t y. The former says that if x is normatively preferred to y and is tempted
by z, then y must be tempted by z as well. The latter says that if x is tempted by z
and y is not tempted by z, then x must be tempted by y. Thus, in both these cases the
\is tempted by" relation (!t) induces a total order on the space X = fx;y;zg imply-
ing that there is a single dimension along which temptation is de¯ned. Multi-dimensional
temptation may then be de¯ned by the property that the relation `!t' is not an order on X.
This paper provides axiomatic foundations for a model of temptation without uncer-
tainty that (i) allows for both temptation aggregation and multi-dimensional temptation,
and (ii) contains the Strotz model as a special case. The forthcoming sections of the paper
are structured as follows. Section 2 serves two purposes. First, we take a closer look at
the Strotz utility and provide an alternative (but equivalent) axiomatization for this model
from the one given in GP (2005). Second, we introduce a new utility called the partition
model and provide a representation theorem for this utility. The partition utility can accom-
modate some kinds of multi-dimensional temptation (e.g. the example given above), but
like the Strotz model it also does not allow for temptation aggregation. Section 3 analyzes
3Both of these issues were addressed as shortcomings of the GP (2001) model in DLR (2008); however,
the generalized model in DLR (2008) addresses some of these problems by injecting uncertainty into the
utility. That is, existence of uncertainty is again con°ated with the question of existence of self-control.
The examples of aggregation and multi-dimensional temptation that we present do not admit a DLR (2008)
representation.
3a generalization of the partition model, called the category model, that accommodates both
temptation aggregation and multi-dimensional temptation. Moreover, the category model
contains the Strotz model as a special case. This section contains the main results of the
paper - a pair of representation theorems for the category model. Section 4 concludes and
the appendix collects proofs omitted from the text.
2 The Strotz Model and the Partition Model
The following is a description of the choice environment.
² Let X = fx1;:::;xng be an enumeration of the prize space.
² Let 2X denote the collection of subsets of X (menus).
² Let P(X) be the set of complete, rational preference relations de¯ned on 2X.
The following restriction will be in place for the main representation results of the paper.
The axiom is not strictly necessary for the utility representation results. On the other hand,
if we remove the restriction the arguments for some of the representation results become
much more complex. Also, identifying an element x 2 X with its normative value u(x) is
consistent with the interpretation that the forthcoming models represent `no uncertainty'
preferences since the ex ante and ex post value of a singleton menu fxg should then be the
same.
Axiom 0: º jX is a strict preference.
Let P
0(X) denote the preferences in P(X) that satisfy Axiom 0. For those results where
we require Axiom 0 to be in place, we will speci¯cally state that the conclusion holds only
for the class P
0(X). Otherwise, the results are taken to hold for the full class P(X) which
is the default domain of analysis. Make the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 1: Fix any A 2 2X. An element x 2 A such that B » A;8B µ A with
x 2 B is called a strong equivalent of A. Let CE(A) denote the strong equivalents of a
menu A.
Axiom 1:(No Uncertainty) If A 6= ;, then CE(A) 6= ;.
Axiom 10: (Degenerate Set-Betweenness) For any menus A;B either A [ B » A or
A [ B » B.
The name for the second axiom is amended from the original title for the related axiom
introduced in Gul-Pesendorfer (2001) in their original study of temptation preference. Note
that Axiom 1 implies Axiom 10. Moreover, the converse is true.
Lemma 2.1. Axiom 10 implies Axiom 1.
4Proof. Consider the set §(A) = fx 2 A : x » Ag. We claim that there is some xA 2 A
such that 8B µ A with xA 2 B we have B » A. Otherwise, for each x such that x » A
there is a subset B(x) µ A with x 2 B(x) and A 6» B(x). Put A0 := An [§(A) B(x) and
note that A = [§(A) B(x)[A0. By Axiom 10, A » A0 which implies that 9x 2 A0 such that
x » A. On the other hand, x 2 B(x) and B(x) \ A0 = ; - contradiction.
The following de¯nition just re-labels the parameters of the Strotz utility.
De¯nition 2: Let u : X ! R be a commitment ranking and let L : X ! f1;:::;jXjg
denote a labeling of the elements of the prize space X. De¯ne the induced relation, ºL, on
X as follows: x ºL y if and only if L(x) · L(y). Put
U
L(A) := u(ºL ¡maxx2A x)
and call this a rank-based representation.
Note that the utility UL evaluates a menu A by considering the commitment value of
the ºL-maximal element in A. Note that when we take Lc : X ! f1;:::;jXjg to be the
canonical labeling induced by the ranking on singleton menus, then UL(¢) is just the usual
\trivial" menu utility that selects the highest ranked singleton from each menu.
De¯nition 3: (Gul-Pesendorfer (2001)) Let u : X ! R be a commitment mapping and
v : X ! R be a temptation ranking. Let Av := arg maxx2A v(x) and put
U
ST(A) := maxx2Av u(x)
where the super-script stands for Strotz utility.
In GP (2001), a representation result is provided for Strotz utilities. It is a simple
exercise to check that the Strotz and rank-based utility models are equivalent. However, in
this paper we will stick with the rank-based utility formulation. The main reason for this
is that we now introduce another model of temptation without uncertainty, the partition
model. Using the rank-based formulation makes it much easier to carry out comparisons
with the partition model. For example, using the primitives (u(¢);L(¢)) allows for a simple
and concrete characterization of the set of preferences that form the intersection of the
rank-based and partition model.
Example 2.1. Let º 2 P(X) be the DGP function generated by (u;v) where u : X ! R
is strict and v : X ! R is constant. Note that this preference is also represented by the
pair (u;v0) where u = v0, so that v(¢) is not identi¯able from preference.
The following Theorem characterizes preferences representable by rank-based utilities.
Theorem 2.1. (Gul-Pesendorfer (2001)) A preference º 2 P(X) satis¯es Axiom 1 if and
only if it can be represented by a rank-based utility.
5We now turn our attention to an alternative model of no uncertainty temptation pref-
erences.
De¯nition 4: Let ti Bi be a partition of X and u : X ! R a commitment mapping.
De¯ne a partition utility, UP(¢), as follows:
U
P(A) := maxi fminx2A\Bi u(x)g
The following example shows that the partition-based model is distinct from the rank-based
model.
Example 2.2. Let X = fx1;x2;x3;x4g where u(x1) > u(x2) > u(x3) > u(x4). Put
B1 = fx1;x3g;B2 = fx2;x4g and set UP(A) = maxi=1;2 fminx2A\Bi u(x)g. Note that
the preference generated by UP(¢) does not satisfy Axiom 1: fx1;x2;x3;x4g » fx3g, yet
fx3;x2g » fx2g Â fx3g.
Call a menu A temptation free if for any pair x;y 2 A with x Â y we have fx;yg » fxg.
Introduce the following axioms,
Axiom ^ 1: If A [ B is temptation free, then A [ B » A or A [ B » B.
Axiom 2: (Reduction) If x Â y and fx;yg » y, then A » A [ x for any A 3 y.
The former axiom clearly weakens Axiom 1 by requiring that Degenerate Set-Betweenness
only holds on temptation free menus. The latter axiom can be seen as a consistency con-
dition on the preference: Think of the ¯rst statement (y » fx;yg) as saying that y tempts
x. The axiom requires that when we enlarge the ambient menu from fx;yg to A 3 y, the
menu A should still tempt x since the original temptation y is still present. Note that
Axiom 1 (no uncertainty) implies this consistency property. Moreover, since Axioms 1 and
10 are equivalent, Axiom 10 evidently implies Axiom 2 - a fact that is quite surprising - it
would be interesting to construct a proof of this implication without using the equivalence
between Axioms 1 and 10. Despite these relations between the axioms, the UL(¢) model is
genuinely distinct from the UP(¢) model as a consequence of the following pair of axioms.
Axiom 3a: For x Â y Â z, if x !t y and x !t z, then y !t z.
Axiom 3b: For x Â y Â z, if x !t z and y !t z, then x !t y.
These are strong restrictions and although clearly required by the partition utility model,
they are not implied by the rank-based model. Consider the following example, which
admits a rank-based representation but no partition model representation.
Example 2.3. Let X = fx Â y Â zg and let x !t y;x !t z, but y 6!t z. Put y ÂL z ÂL x
and note that UL(A) := u(ºL ¡maxx2A x) represents º.
6The following Theorem characterizes partition-based no uncertainty utilities. The proof
requires the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. Assume º 2 P(X) satis¯es Axiom 2. If x !t y;y !t z, then x !t z.
Proof. By Axiom 2, fy;zg » z implies that fx;y;zg » fx;zg. Similarly, fx;yg » y implies
that fx;y;zg » fy;zg. Thus, fx;zg » fx;y;zg » fy;zg » z so that x !t z.
Theorem 2.2. A preference º 2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axioms ^ 1;2;3a, and 3b if and only if it
admits a representation by the partition model.
Proof. We only check su±ciency as necessity is obvious. Elicit a subjective partition as
follows. Let fx1;:::;xng be an ordered (top-down) enumeration of the elements of X and
put B(1) := fx 2 X : x !t xng [ fxng. Set Xi = Xn [
i¡1
j=1 B(j) and inductively de¯ne
B(i) := fx 2 Xi : x !t inf(Xi)g [ finf(Xi)g
Clearly, the sets fB(i)g are disjoint and partition X. Set xi = inf(B(i)) and let B(xi)
denote the partition that contains xi. De¯ning
U
P(A) := maxi fminx2A\B(xi) u(x)g
we claim that UP(¢) represents º. From the menu A, extract out the set of partition-
dependent minima in A. That is, put xi(A) = arg minA\B(xi) u(x) and consider the set
A
¤ := fx
0(A);:::;x
N(A)g
By successive application of Axioms 2 and 3b we know that A » A¤. Thus, it su±ces to
verify that UP(¢) represents º restricted to the set of menus of the form A¤ (call such menus
non-reducible). We claim that A¤ » sup(A¤). Note that this observation yields the result
since UP(¢) trivially represents the singleton ranking. First verify that A¤ is temptation-
free. Let x;y 2 A¤ with x Â y and x 2 B(xi);y 2 B(xj). If x !t y, then x !t xj by
Lemma 2.2. Since x !t xi and x !t xj, by Axiom 3a we must have xi !t xj or vice versa
(depending on whether xi Â xj or xj Â xi). If, say xi Â xj, then by construction of the
sets B(xi) we must have i > j so that xi 2 B(xj) - a contradiction. Inductively assume the
claim holds for all non-reducible menus of size k ¸ 2 and let A¤ have size k+1. Pick a pair
(x;y) 2 A¤ not equal to sup(A¤) and put A¤ = (A¤nx) [ (A¤ny). By Axiom ^ 1, A¤ » A¤nx
or A¤ » A¤ny. Apply the induction hypothesis to get A¤ » A¤nx » A¤ny » sup(A¤).
We have the following straightforward uniqueness claim, so that partitions are identi¯able
from preference.
Corollary 2.1. Let (fBig;u(¢));(fB0
ig;u0(¢)) be two distinct UP(¢) representations of º.
Then, fBig ´ fB0
ig and u(¢) and u0(¢) are ordinally equivalent.
7Proof. Let (u(¢);fBig) be a given partition-based representation. Denote the partition
constructed in the proof of the Theorem by fB(xi)g. That is, consider the underlying
preference º represented by the given pair (u(¢);fBig) and construct the partitions fB(xi)g
corresponding to this preference º. Let Bt(x) := fy 2 X : x !t yg and note that if x 2 Bi,
then by representability we must have Bt(x) µ Bi. Thus, take any x 2 B(xi) and let
x 2 Bi0. Then, xi 2 Bt(x) µ Bi0. Since fBig partitions X it then follows that B(xi) µ Bi0.
Thus, the partition fBig is a coarsening of fB(xi)g. If there are two distinct B(xi);B(xj)
(with xi Â xj) contained in a common cell Bl, then by representability we obtain xi !t xj
- a contradiction. It follows that fBig ´ fB(xi)g.
Since the partitions fBig are identi¯able from preference we are able to conduct a compar-
ative statics exercise.
Lemma 2.3. Let (fB1
i g;u1(¢));(fB2
i g;u2(¢)) be two UP(¢) preferences that agree on sin-
gletons. Then, º1 has more self-control than º2 if and only if fB2
i g is a coarsening of
fB1
i g.
The proof is trivial and hence omitted. In our previous work on menu choice (i.e.
Chandrasekher (2007)) we discussed models of menu choice with uncertainty where the
menu itself fed back into the agent's understanding of the sources of uncertainty relevant
to that choice. We referred to this phenomenon as \menu-dependence." It is natural to
ask whether there are menu-dependent analogues of the representation theorems we have
presented that capture the notion that the agent faces no ex ante uncertainty and the fact
that the decision procedure used to solve the menu choice is itself a function of the menu.
Towards this end, introduce the following axiom (which is implied by both Axiom 1 and
Axiom 10).
Axiom 100: 8A µ X; 9x 2 A such that x » A.
Thus, the axiom states merely that (i) certainty equivalents always exist, and (ii) every
menu contains its own certainty equivalent. Consider now the following analogues of the
rank-based and partition-based models:
² Let u : X ! R be a commitment mapping and let LA : A ! f1;:::;jAjg be a
menu-based labeling. Put
U
LA(A) := u(ºLA ¡maxx2A x)
² For each A µ X let ti Bi(A) be a (menu-dependent) partition of A, let u : X ! R
and put
U
PA(A) := maxi fminx2Bi(A) u(x)g
The following observation records that both these models are equivalent and characterizes
preferences that satisfy Axiom 100.
Observation 1. A preference º2 P(X) satis¯es Axiom 100 if and only if it can be repre-
sented by a UPA(¢) utility if and only if it can be represented by a ULA(¢) utility.
8The models of menu-dependent no uncertainty preferences described above take a some-
what extreme approach towards modeling menu-dependence. For example, in the partition-
based model it need not be the case that the menu-dependent temptation categories fBi(A)g
are completely idiosyncratic. For example, consider the following natural specialization of
the UPA(¢) model.
De¯nition 5: Let u : X ! R be a commitment mapping and say that a family of menu-
dependent partitions, fBi(A)g, is coherent if whenever A µ D, the partition f(Bi(D)\A)g
is a coarsening of fBi(A)g (call the corresponding utility, UPA(¢), a local partitions model).
Introduce the following weakening of Axiom 1 (no uncertainty).
Axiom 1¤: For any B 2 2X;9xB 2 B such that (i) xB » B and (ii) A º B for any
A µ B with xB 2 A.
Let WCE(A) denote the subset of elements of A that satis¯es the conditions of the above
axiom (i.e. the set of weak equivalents). We now show that Axiom 1¤ is not the only
observable restriction of the local partition model (this is in contrast to the local cate-
gory model, see Theorem 3.5). To introduce this axiom we require some notation. Denote
WCE(A) := fxA 2 A : (i)fxAg » A;(ii)D » A;8D µ A;xA 2 Dg. Call a menu A µ B a
basic subset of B if the following two properties hold: (i) WCE(A) \ inf(A) 6= ;, and (ii)
whenever A µ D µ B and CE(D) » inf(D) » A we have A = D.
Axiom 20: Let A1;A2 be basic subsets of some menu B with A1 Â A2. If WCE(A1)
is singleton, then either A1 µ A2 or A1 \ A2 = ;.
Lemma 2.4. If º admits a coherent UPA(¢) representation, then it satis¯es Axiom 20.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, let A1;A2 be basic subsets of B with A1 Â A2 and non-
empty intersection (and A1 6µ A2). Consider B¤ = A1 [ A2 and note that A1;A2 must
be basic subsets of B¤. By representability and the fact that Ai » inf(Ai) we know that
inf(Bj(Ai)) \ CE(Ai) 6= ; for all partition cells Bj(Ai) µ Ai. Now if x¤ 2 A1 \ A2, then
consider the cells BA1(x¤);BA2(x¤) (here BA(x) denotes the unique cell Bi(A) such that
x 2 Bi(A)). By coherence, each BAi(x¤) µ BA1[A2(x¤). Axiom 1¤ implies that for each
menu A and each x 2 A, there is a unique basic subset of A, call it Ax, with x » Ax.
To see this, assume to the contrary that there are two such basic subsets, say A1
x;A2
x, and
consider their union A¤
x = A1
x [ A2
x. By Axiom 1¤ and the fact that inf(A¤) » x, we
must have x » A¤. This then implies A1
x = A¤ = A2
x (since Ai
x are basic). Also observe
that A2 » inf(BA2(x¤)) µ BA1[A2(x¤). If WCE(A1) is singleton, then BA1(x¤) = A1
so that A1 = BA1(x¤) µ BA1[A2(x¤). Moreover, for each y 2 A2nBA1[A2(x¤) we have
BA2(y)\WCE(A2) 6= ; by representability. Thus, by coherence BA1[A2(y)\WCE(A2) 6= ;.
It follows that 8x 2 A1 [ A2;BA1[A2(x) \ WCE(A2) 6= ;. By representability, this implies
that A1 [ A2 » A2 - contradicting maximality of A2.
We wish to obtain a representation result for the UPA(¢) utility where the menu-indexed
family of partitions, fBAgA, is coherent. To concretely illustrate how a family of coherent
9partitions may be constructed, we ¯rst work through an example. The example also demon-
strates that it is impossible to uniquely identify the family fBAgA of coherent partitions in
our setting.
Example 2.4. Let X = fx;y;z;wg where w Â z Â y Â x and denoting weak equivalents
with underscores, put
fx;z;wg Â fy;z;wg » fx;y;zg » fx;y;z;wg Â fx;y;wg
Note that Axiom 1¤ requires that fa;bg » b whenever b Â a. It is easily checked that the
preference satis¯es Axioms 1¤ and 2¤. We construct a coherent family of partitions fBi(A)g
so that the corresponding UPA(¢) function represents º. De¯ne x - neighborhoods as follows
(we implicitly take Bx(A) = fxg when not explicitly speci¯ed):
Bx(fx;z;wg) = fxg;Bx(fx;y;z;wg) = fx;y;wg
De¯ne y-neighborhoods:
By(fx;y;wg) = fy;wg;By(fy;z;wg) = fy;wg;By(fx;y;z;wg) = fx;y;wg
Note that the associated UPA(¢) is (i) coherent, and (ii) represents the preference º. We also
observe that the example shows that in our framework we cannot uniquely identify the class
of partitions in the representation. For example, we could have taken Bx(fx;y;wg) = fx;wg
and By(fx;y;wg) = fyg and still obtained a coherent representation.
A representation result for the local partition model is still missing at the moment and
is the subject of ongoing research.
3 The Category Model
In this section we introduce the main class of utility models in the paper. This class of
utilities will be given the general title of the category model. The category model gener-
alizes both the Strotz model and the Partition model introduced in the preceding section.
Moreover, it completes the conceptual goal laid out in the introduction: to obtain a model
of temptation without uncertainty that exhibits both multi-dimensional temptation and
aggregation of self-control problems. Since these two behavioral phenomena are concep-
tual distinct, this section contains two representations for the category model. The ¯rst
is for a specialization of full category model that we call the rigid category model. The
rigid category model generalizes the Partition model and allows for a much richer variety
of multi-dimensional temptation than allowed by the Partition model. The second rep-
resentation result in the section is for the full category model. The virtue of providing
the intermediate representation is that we can behaviorally identify, and hence, distinguish
between multi-dimensional temptation and aggregation of self-control problems.
The ¯nal representation theorem in this section characterizes what we call the local
category model. This model nests the category model. Moreover, it generalizes the co-
herent partition model (for which we have not yet provided a representation theorem) as
10well as the Strotz model. The intuitive description of the local category model is that we
simply assume that the categories that the agent uses to evaluate a menu are themselves
a function of the menu. Moreover, to add some structure to the preference we take the
menu-dependent collection of categories to satisfy a similar coherence condition to the one
prescribed for the local partition model.
De¯nition 6: Let u : X ! R be a commitment mapping and let B be a collection of
sets with the following two properties,
1. (Completeness) [D2B D = X.
2. (Non-Redundance) 8D 2 B;D 6µ [D02B D0.
Call a system of sets B that satis¯es these properties a category.
De¯nition 7: Let (u(¢);B) be a pair consisting of a commitment utility u : X ! R
and a category B. A utility function U : P(X) ! R is called a category model (denoted
hereafter, UB) if it is given by the formula U(A) := maxD2B fminx2D\A u(x)g.
De¯nition 8: Let u : X ! R be a commitment mapping and let A µ X be a ¯xed
subset. De¯ne a speci¯c category, BA, as follows:
1. For each D 2 BA there is a unique xD 2 A such that xD 2 D \ A.
2. For each D 2 BA, D µ fx : xD º xg.
3. (Completeness) [D2BA D = X.
Identify the corresponding category utility with the triple (u(¢);A;BA) and call this a rigid
category model.
Let (u(¢);B) be a category-pair. Note that by non-redundance we can ¯nd a set A µ X
such that each D 2 B can be identi¯ed with a unique xD 2 A \ D. Thus, the extra
restriction that makes the model a rigid category is the second condition above which
states that the elements of the neighborhood, D, containing a given xD 2 A are precisely
those elements z 2 XnA that tempt xD (i.e. xD !t z). Why is this the right generalization
of the partition-based model? To see why this is true note that a partition B = fDig of X
can equivalently be described by the following two properties:
1. [i Di = X
2. For each x 2 Di, x = 2 [j6=i Dj.
The rigid category model relaxes the latter property to the requirement that there exists
an x 2 Di such that x = 2 [j6=i Dj rather than requiring this property hold for all x 2 Di.
Thus, a given x 2 X can tempt multiple elements in di®erent neighborhoods of the cat-
egory. The full category model further relaxes this model by allowing temptations to be
non-binary. Thus, it allows us to model preferences where, for example, x » y;x » z but,
11nevertheless, fxg Â fx;y;zg. As in the previous section, we will also be interested in the
menu-dependent version of this utility.
De¯nition 9: For each menu A let B(A) be a (menu-dependent) category. Say that
the system fB(A)g is coherent if the following additional property holds:
1. If A µ A0, then for each DA 2 B(A);9DA0 2 B(A0) with DA µ DA0.
De¯ne a local category utility as follows: UB(A)(A) := maxD2B(A) fminx2D u(x)g.
Note that Axiom 10 (no uncertainty) implies Axiom 100 and Axiom 2. Thus, the rank-
based model is a specialization of the category based model (with a possibly redundant
category). We explicitly show this now in the special case where the singleton ranking,
º jX, is strict. That is, given a rank-based pair (u(¢);L(¢)), we back out an explicit
category BL where the pair (u(¢);BL) is such that UBL(¢) = UL(¢). Let X = fx1;:::;xng be
the L-labeling of X. For each xi put Di := Bt(xi) [ fxig where Bt(x) := fy : x !t yg. Set
B := fDig and note that if º admits a rank-based representation, then the collection B is
typically not non-redundant.
Proposition 3.1. Let Di := Bt(xi) [ fxig and let (u(¢);B) be the corresponding category-
based pair. Then, UB(¢) ´ UL(¢).
Proof. Note that if xA = arg minz2A L(z), then Bt(xA) \ A = ;. Thus, UB(A) ¸ u(xA) ¸
UL(A). To show the reverse inequality note that for any x Â xA with x 2 A we must
have L(x) > L(xA). Thus, x !t xA so that minz2(Bt(x)[fxg)\A u(z) · u(xA). It follows that
UB(A) · u(xA) = UL(A).
Note that the category used to represent the rank-based model is not non-redundant.
This begs the question of whether we can actually do better in general and represent the
rank-based model with a non-redundant system of categories. The following example shows
that the answer to this question is negative.
Example 3.1. Let X = fx1 Â x2 Â x3g and de¯ne x2 ÂL x3 ÂL x1. Note that if (u(¢);B)
is a category-based model that represents the preference º generated by the rank-based pair
(u(¢);L(¢)) then let Cx1 2 B be a set that contains x1. Since x1 !t x2;x1 !t x3 we
must have x2;x3 2 Cx1. But non-redundance then implies that B = fCx1g. This implies
UB(fx2;x3g) = u(x3) 6= u(x2) = UL(fx2;x3g) - contradicting representability.
We now turn our attention to the representation results for the category-based models.
It turns out that the key to the su±ciency construction is to closely analyze the structure
of a certain family of equivalence relations, fºAgA, that can be backed out from menu
choice data alone. To introduce the de¯nition of these equivalence relations ¯rst recall the
following axiom, introduced in DLR (2008):
Positive Set-Betweenness: A º B ) A º A [ B.
12Observe that Axiom 1¤ implies Positive Set-Betweenness. For a ¯xed cardinal represen-
tation, U(¢), of º, let
umin(x;A) := minfU(D) : D µ A;x 2 Dg
Note that for a given utility kernel umin(x;A) we can de¯ne a relation ºA on the elements
of A via x ºA y if and only if umin(x;A) ¸ umin(y;A). The Positive Set-Betweenness axiom
yields the following important structural result on this relation. Let Ax denote the maximal
menu such that U(Ax) = umin(x;A) and put µx(A) := fy : x ºA yg.
Proposition 3.2. Ax = µx(A).
Proof. Note that if x ºA y, then Ax º Ay. This implies, by Positive Set-Betweenness, that
Ax º Ax [ Ay. Maximality then implies Ax = Ax [ Ay. Thus, µx(A) µ Ax. To check the
reverse containment, let y 2 Ax with y ºA x. Then, u(y;A) = U(Ay) · U(Ax) = u(x;A).
On the other hand, y ºA x implies, by de¯nition, u(y;A) ¸ u(x;A) so that y »A x.
Let IA(x) denote the ºA equivalence class of an element x and let I1
A;:::;Ik
A be a top-
down enumeration of the ºA equivalence classes. The following proposition characterizes
the certainty equivalents of a menu using the information provided by the relation ºA.
Proposition 3.3. Let º2 P(X) satisfy Axiom 1¤. Then, WCE(A) = inffy : y 2 I1
Ag.
Proof. First observe that WCE(A) µ I1
A: Otherwise, if x 2 WCE(A)\I
j
A for some j > 1,
then by Axiom 1¤ we obtain [j¸2 I
j
A º A. On the other hand, by the preceding lemma,
A = [k
j=1 I
j
A Â [j¸2 I
j
A - contradiction. Thus, WCE(A) µ I1
A. Now for any y 2 I1
A consider
the menu A0 := fy;I2
A;:::;Ik
Ag and note that A0 º A, again by de¯nition of ºA. Take
any x 2 WCE(A) so that we obtain: A0 º A » x. On the other hand, we claim that
umin(y;A0) = U(A0). To see this, observe that umin(x;A0) = umin(x;A);8x 2 A0ny by the
previous lemma. Since umin(y;A) > umin(x;A);8x 2 A0ny it follows that
umin(y;A
0) ¸ umin(y;A) > umin(x;A) = umin(x;A
0); for all x 2 A
0ny
Therefore, by the preceding lemma, we must have umin(y;A0) = U(A0). Thus, we obtain
U(fyg) = umin(y;fyg) ¸ umin(y;A
0) = U(A
0) ¸ U(A) = U(fxg)
It follows that y º x;8y 2 I1
A, implying that WCE(A) µ inffy : y 2 I1
Ag. To show the
reverse containment, simply note that if y 2 inffy : y 2 I1
Ag and y 2 B µ A, then by
de¯nition of ºA we have B º A.
Similar arguments can be utilized to show the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let I1
A;:::;Ik
A be a top-down enumeration of the ºA indi®erence classes.
Then, infI1
A Â infI2
A Â ¢¢¢ Â infIk
A.
13These facts allow us to introduce the following axiom. For a given menu A, let A¤ =
[k
i=1 inf(Ii
A) denote the sub-menu of certainty equivalents in each ºA indi®erence class.
Note that the de¯nition of the family of relations ºA does not depend on the choice of
cardinal utility U(¢).
Axiom 2¤: (Strong Reduction) Let A be a menu with A¤ de¯ned as above. If A¤ µ B µ A,
then B » A.
Call Axiom 2 from the previous section the Reduction axiom. As the name suggests,
Strong Reduction coupled with the Positive Set-Betweenness Axiom implies the Reduction
Axiom. We record this observation in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Strong Reduction plus Axiom 1¤ implies Reduction.
Proof. Let x !t y and assume x;y 2 A. It su±ces to show that A¤ µ Anx. To see this
note that if x 2 A¤ then x 2 inf(Ii
A) for some ºA-class Ii
A. But then x !t y implies that
u(x;A) · U(fyg), whereas by de¯nition we know that u(x;A) = U(inf(Ii
A) = U(fxg) >
U(fyg) - a contradiction. Thus, x = 2 A¤. By Strong Reduction, Anx » A.
Call a menu A simple if A = A¤.
Lemma 3.3. Assume º2 P(X) satis¯es Axiom 1¤ and Strong Reduction and let A be
simple. Then, for any y 2 X, fyg º A [ fyg º A, when y º A and A º A [ fyg º fyg
when A Â y.
Proof. Break into two cases, (i) y Â A, and (ii) y ¹ A. In the former case, if fyg Â A[fyg
then (A [ fyg)¤ µ A so that A » A [ fyg by Axiom 2¤. In the latter case, if y » A and
A[fyg Á A then we again have (A[fyg)¤ µ A so that fyg » A » A[fyg - contradiction,
so that y » A » A [ fyg in this case. If A Â y, then note that if A [ fyg Á fyg we must
have (A [ fyg)¤ µ A, which implies A » A [ fyg by Axiom 2¤ - a contradiction. Thus,
A [ fyg º fyg.
We now introduce the ¯nal axiom required for the representation result for the rigid
category model. Let xB denote a weak equivalent for a menu B and IB(x) denotes the
ºB-equivalence class of x.
Axiom 3¤: (Consistency) There is a maximal simple set A such that:
² If y » B [ y, then there is a B0 ¶ B [ y such that B0 » y and IB0(y) \ A 6= ;.
² If B is simple with x 2 B \ A and x 6»B[z z, then x 6»B[z y (for any y 2 B).
Now turn to the representation results for the category-based models. The ¯rst two theo-
rems provide representation results for the (global) category model, and the third Theorem
gives a representation for the local category model. Both models generalize the Strotz
model.
14Theorem 3.1. A preference º 2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axioms 1¤ ¡ 3¤ if and only if it admits
a rigid category utility representation.
Proof. We ¯rst check necessity of some of the axioms. Note that necessity of Axiom 1¤ is
obvious, hence the proof is omitted.
Necessity of Axiom 2¤
Let (u;C) be a representing category. Fix a menu A and let I1
A;:::;Ik
A be a top-down enu-
meration of the ºA indi®erence classes. Observe that for any element Ci 2 C we have either
A \ Ci = ; or A \ Ci 6= ; and inf(A \ Ci) µ infIn
A for some n. This immediately yields
A » A¤. Now note that if x 2 A\Ci with x 2 I
j
A, then we must have inf(A\Ci) µ inf(Im
A ),
where m ¸ j. It follows that if A¤ µ B µ A, then B » A so that Axiom 2¤ holds.
Necessity of Axiom 3¤
Let (u(¢);A;C) be a rigid category that represents º and let A = fz1 Â ¢¢¢ Â zng be a
top-down enumeration. Note that A is clearly simple (w.r.t. the induced preference º).
Moreover, A is maximal and simple since each zi 2 C is contained in a unique neighborhood
Dzi 2 C. Let B be any other simple menu with x;y 2 B and x 2 A. Assume that x 6»B[z z.
Since x 2 A we know that umin(x;C) = minz2C\Dx u(z). Thus, since x 6»B[z z and B is
simple we must have z = 2 Dx by rigidity. It follows that (since y = 2 Dx) x 6»B[z y.
Su±ciency
For brevity, denote the the maximal simple set A satisfying the Consistency property simply
A. I will associate a pre-category, a collection of sets Cx(A), one for each x 2 A, as follows.
Let fy1;:::;yng be a top-down enumeration of the elements of XnA. Put A := fx1;:::;xhg
and let A(i) := fxi;xi+1;:::;xhg. For each xi 2 A say that yj 2 Ct
xi(A) if and only if (i)
xi Â yj, and (ii) A(i) Â A(i) [ yj. Put Cxi := Ct
xi(A) [ fxig. Note that by maximality of A
there is some z 2 A [ y such that IA[y(z) is non-singleton. I claim that there is only one
non-singleton ºA[y-class and that it is always the ºA[y class of y. Otherwise, there is some
z 2 A with IA[y(z) non-singleton (and with y = 2 IA[y(z)). By Strong Reduction, taking
z = inf(IA[y(z)) we must have z Â y. Let x;z 2 IA[y(z) and put A1 = [fx0:zºA[yx0g IA[y(x).
Since A¤
1 µ A¤
1 [ fxg, Strong Reduction implies that A¤
1 [ fxg » A1, which implies that
x »A¤
1[x z. On the other hand, (A¤
1[x)ny is simple and x 6»A¤
1[x y, which implies x 6»A¤
1[x z
by Consistency - a contradiction. In fact, this argument shows that we must have y con-
tained in any non-singleton ºA[y, implying that there is a unique non-singleton class which
is exactly IA[y(y).
Note that by Lemma 3.3, for any simple menu B we have B º B [y º y or y º B [y º B
according to whether B º y or y Â B (resp.). For a menu A(i) where y Â xi say that y is
a relative commitment if y Â A(i) [ y.
Claim 3.1. For any y 2 XnA, there is some A(i) such that A(i) Â A(i) [ y.
Proof. Note that by Lemma 3.3, the statement is only possible for those xi with A(i) Â y.
Consider the menu fyg and note that the ¯rst part of the Consistency Axiom implies that
15there is some B0 ¶ fyg such that y » B0 and IB0(y) \ A 6= ;. Let xy 2 IB0(y) \ A and
note that xy Â y. Put D = (B0)¤ [xy and note that xy »D y. Successively delete elements
of Dn(A [ y) and iteratively apply the second part of the Consistency Axiom to obtain
xy »fxy;yg y. Thus, A(xy) Â A(xy) [ y.
Claim 3.2. For every xi with y Â xi we have A(i) [ y » y.
Proof. Towards contradiction, say that there is some i with y Â xi and A(i)[y » A(i) and
let xi denote the º-minimal such element of A. Consider the class of y in A[y. I claim that
we must have IA[y(y) = fy;xig. To see this note that umin(y;A [ y) · umin(y;A(i) [ y) ·
u(xi). Thus, inf(IA[y(y)) ¹ xi. Minimality of xi then implies that inf(IA[y(y)) = xi.
Moreover, note that if there is some other xj 2 IA[y(y), then A1 := fxj;xig [ fx : xi ºA[y
xg » xi by Strong Reduction. On the other hand, A1 µ A which implies A1 » xj Â xi -
contradiction. Thus, IA[y(y) = fy;xig. Put A1 := [x:xiºA[yx IA[y(x). Successively deleting
elements of A1nxi and iteratively applying Consistency we obtain xi »fxi;yg y.4 By the
preceding claim, there is some A(j) such that A(j) Â A(j)[y. Since xi 2 A(j) and xi »fxi;yg
y we must then have umin(y;A(j) [ y) · u(xi) < u(y), so that y = 2 (A(j) [ y)¤. Thus,
(A(j)[y)¤ µ A(j) implying that A(j) » A(j)[y by Strong Reduction - contradiction.
Claim 3.3. For any x 2 A we have yi 2 Cx(A) if and only if x »A[yi yi.
Proof. To show this, assume ¯rst that yi 2 Cx(A). Then, the Consistency Axiom implies
that yi ºA[yi x. If yi ÂA[yi x, then since x Â yi there must be some z 2 A such that
x »A[yi z. Let A0 := [xºA[yiy y and note that A0 µ A. Thus. x »A[yi z implies that x »A z
- contradiction since A is simple. Thus, x »A[yi yi. Conversely, assume that x »A[yi yi.
I claim that yi 2 Cx(A). To see this let I1
A[yi;:::;Ik
A[yi be a top-down enumeration of
the ºA[yi indi®erence classes and say that x;yi 2 I
j1
A . Put A0 := [j¸j1 I
j
A[yi. and let
A1 = (A0nI
j1
A[yi) [ (x [ yi). Claim that (A0)¤ µ A1. To see this it su±ces to check that
inf(I
j1
A[yi) = yi. Note that if this was not true, then there is some z 2 A (x Á z) with
inf(I
j1
A[yi) = z which implies that (A0)¤ µ (A0nI
j1
A[yi) [ fzg so that, by Strong Reduction,
we get A0 » (A0nI
j1
A[yi) [ fzg » z. On the other hand, A0nI
j1
A[yi [ fzg µ A and A is simple
so we know that sup(A0nI
j1
A[yi) » A0nI
j1
A[yi [ fzg - contradiction. Thus, inf(I
j1
A[yi) = yi so
that putting A2 := fz 2 A : x º zg[fyig we ¯nd that (A0)¤ µ A2 which implies, by Strong
Reduction again, that A2 » yi. Thus, yi 2 Cx(A).
Notice that as a consequence of the Consistency Axiom we know that for any x 2 A [ yi
with x 6»A[yi y, the equivalence class IA[yi(x) = fxg. Now let xB 2 CE(B). The remainder
of the argument breaks into 3 cases, according to whether (i) xB Â y1, (ii) xB = y1, (iii)
y1 Â xB. Note that this list is exhaustive.
Claim 3.4. Put X = fx1 Â x2 Â ¢¢¢xng a top-down enumeration and let A be the maximal
simple subset given by Axiom 3¤. Put fy1;:::ykg = XnA and for a given B µ A with x 2 B
4This is where we use the full force of the Consistency Axiom. Whereas most arguments in this proof
will be cited verbatim for the argument for Theorem 3.2, this claim does not go through precisely because
the stronger form of consistency does not hold for the full category model.
16de¯ne the `neighborhoods' Cx(B) as before. That is, put B(x) := fz 2 B : x º zg and say
that yi 2 Cx(B) if and only if B(x) Â B(x) [ yi (where x Â yi). Then, Cx(B) = Cx(A).
Proof. For any menu D let xD denote an element of CE(D). First show that Cx(B) µ Cx(A).
Note that if y 2 Cx(B) then clearly u(fyg) = umin(x;B [ y) ¸ umin(x;A [ y) so that
y 2 Cx(A). Conversely, let x 2 Cx(A). Towards contradiction, assume that y = 2 Cx(B) so
that x ÂB[y y. Now put A0 = A[y and let I1
A0;:::;Ik
A0 be the ºA0 - indi®erence classes. Let
y 2 I
i1
A0 and note that I1
A0;:::;I
i1¡1
A0 are singleton (by Consistency) and I
i1+1
A0 ;:::;Ik
A0 are also
singleton (as A is simple). Put A0 := B\f[j·i1¡1 I
j
Ag and let A1 := A0[fx;yg[f[j>i1 I
j
Ag.
Let B1 = BnA0. Note that x »B1 y implies that x »B[y y. Let fz1;:::;zkg = f[j>i1 I
j
AgnB.
Let A1 := A1nA0 (note that x »A1 y so that y » A1)) and put A2 = A1nz1. Note that if
x 6»A2 y, then by Consistency and the fact that A is simple we must have x 2 A¤
2. Also
observe that since umin(y;A1) = u(fyg) we must have umin(y;A2) = u(fyg) so that y 2 A¤
2.
Finally, note that simplicity of A implies that x 6»A¤
2[z1 z1 and since A¤
1 µ A¤
2 [ z1 we
must have y 6»A¤
2[z1 z1 (as y » A1 » A¤
2 [ z1 by Strong Reduction). Thus, by Consistency
we have x 6»A¤
2[z1 y which implies A¤
2 [ z1 º x - contradiction. Thus, x »A2 y. Now
apply the above argument to A3 := A2nz2. Note that since we have shown x »A1 y
implies x »A2 y;8x 2 IA(y) we obtain that y » A2. Thus, iterating the above argument
we obtain that x »A2 y implies x »A3 y. Inductively proceeding we obtain, x »Ak¡1 y,
where Ak¡1 = A1nfz1;:::;zkg = B1 (and Ak¡1 » y by induction). Note that this implies
umin(x;B [ y) · u(fyg). Simplicity of A then implies that umin(x;B [ y) = u(fyg) so that
x »B[y y.
Note that for any menu B we can write B := B1 t B2 where B1 µ A;B2 µ XnA (note
that either set may be empty). Let DB := fx 2 AnB : Cx(A) \ B 6= ;g. Put B0 := B [ D.
Call a menu B saturated if DB µ B and denote the saturation of a menu B with the
notation, Bsat.
Claim 3.5. UC(B) = UC(Bsat) and B » Bsat.
Proof. Note that UC(B) := maxx2A minB\Cx(A) u(z). If x 2 D, then by de¯nition minz2B\Cx(A) u(z) =
minz2Bsat\Cx(A) u(z). Thus, UC(B) = UC(Bsat). To see the second part note that for each
x 2 D we have umin(x;Bsat) · umin(x;B1 [ D [ y) · u(fyg) (by the previous claim) for
some y(x Â y) 2 Cx(A) \ B. Thus, x = 2 (Bsat)¤ so that Bsat » B by Strong Reduction.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 we check that the equality U(B) = UC(B) holds for
all saturated sets. For ¯xed B (such that B [ fx 2 XnB : Cx(B) \ B2 6= ;g = B) proceed
by induction on jB2j. The argument in the text takes care of the case where jB2j = 1.
Let B = B1 t B2, where B2 = fy1;:::;ykg µ XnA (where yi Â yi+1). We need to check
representability in each of the cases, (i) xB Â y1, (ii) xB » y1, and (iii) y1 Â xB º y2.
Case 1: xB Â y1.
Note that this implies that yi = 2 CxB(A);8yi so that UC(B) ¸ U(B). To show the reverse
inequality it su±ces to show that if x Â xB, then yi 2 Cx(A) for some yi 2 fy1;:::;ykg. We
prove this claim by breaking into two-subcases.
17Sub-case (i): fy1;:::;ykg 6µ B¤.
Let fy1;:::;ykg = B2. If B2 6µ B¤, then B¤ µ Bnyi for some i. By Strong Reduction,
U(B) = U(Bnyi). By the induction hypothesis, U(Bnyi) = UC(Bnyi). Moreover, by de¯ni-
tion of the function UC(¢) we also have UC(Bnyi) ¸ UC(B). Thus, U(B) ¸ UC(B). To show
the reverse, note that xB Â y1 implies that xB 6»B1[yi yi;8yi 2 B. Thus, by the preceding
claims, yi = 2 CxB(B1) = CxB(A) which implies that UC(B) ¸ minz2Cx(A)\B u(z) = u(xB) =
U(B).
Sub-case (ii): fy1;:::;ykg µ B¤.
Now assume that fy1;:::;ykg µ B¤. I claim that for any x Â xB we must have x »A[yi yi
for some yi 2 B. To see this consider the class IB(x). If y1 Â inf(IB(x)), then put B0 :=
[xºBz IB(z) µ Bny1 and note that (B0)sat » B0 and moreover, j(B0)sat\(XnA)j < jB2j. By
the induction hypothesis, we therefore obtain UC((B0)sat) = U((B0)sat). If yi = 2 Cx(A);8yi 2
B2, then UC((B0)sat) ¸ u(x) > U(B) - contradiction. Thus, consider now the case where
inf(IB(x)) º y1. Again, put B0 := [xºBz IB(z) and put B(1) := (B0)¤ [ fxg. Note that
by hypothesis we know that fy1;:::;ykg µ (B0)¤. Take B(1)nyi for some yi 2 fy2;:::;ykg
and consider (B(1)nyi)sat. By the induction hypothesis, UC(B(1)nyi)sat) = U((B(1)nyi)sat).
Thus, if x Â xB is such that yi = 2 Cx(A) then we obtain that UC((B(1)nyi)sat) ¸ u(x). On
the other hand, x = sup(B(1)nyi) which implies u(x) ¸ U(B(1)nyi). Since U(B(1)nyi) =
U((B(1)nyi)sat) we obtain B(1)nyi » x. Observe that (B0)¤ µ (B(1)nyi)¤ [ fyig. Thus,
(B(1)nyi)¤[yi » B0 Á x. Note that x 6»(B(1)nyi)¤ y1 since we just found that B(1)nyi » fxg.
Moreover, y1 6»(B(1)nyi)¤[yi yi and x 6»(B(1)nyi)¤[yi yi (since x ºB y1). Thus, by Consistency
x 6»(B(1)nyi)¤[yi y1, implying that B0 º fxg - contradiction.
Case 2: xB = y1.
For each y 2 XnA put §(y) = fxi 2 A : A(i) Â A(i) [ yg. By previous claims, we
know that §(y) 6= ; for each y 2 XnA. Say that a menu B is maximally saturated if
for each y 2 B \ (XnA) we have §(y) µ B. Note that WLOG we can always take B
to be a maximally saturated menu (given B2 = fy2;:::;ykg). I claim this implies that
IB(y1) \ B1 6= ;. Towards contradiction, assume that IB(y1) \ B1 = ;. By the ¯rst part of
the Consistency Axiom, there is some B0 ¶ B with B0 » B and such that IB0(y1) \ A 6= ;.
Let xy1 2 IB0(y1) and note that by iterative application of Consistency we obtain that
xy1 »fxy1;y1g y1. Thus, xy1 »A[y1 y1. But since B is assumed to be maximally saturated we
must have xy 2 B. Since umin(xy1;B0) = u(y1) we must have umin(xy1;B) ¸ u(y1), implying
that xy1 »B y1 - contradiction. Thus, there is some x 2 IB(y1)\B1. Moreover, this implies
that yi = 2 Cx(B1);8yi 2 fy2;:::;ykg. Since Cx(B1) = Cx(A) by the preceding claims, we
obtain yi = 2 Cx(A). Thus, UC(B) ¸ maxfu(x);u(y1)g ¸ U(B). We now check the reverse
inequality. I claim that for any x Â y1 we have yi 2 Cx(A) for some yi 2 fy1;:::;ykg. To-
wards contradiction, assume that there is an x Â y1 such that Cx(A)\fy1;:::;ykg = ; and
pick a º-maximal such element. Consider the sets B(i) := Bnyi for each i and note that by
the induction hypothesis UC(B(i)) = U(B(i)) (note that each of the B(i)'s are saturated
since B is saturated). Thus, UC(B(i)) = u(x0);8B(i) implying that x 2 B(i)¤;8i. Now note
that since xB = y1 we must have fy1;:::;ykg µ B¤ otherwise B¤ µ B(i) for some i, which
18would imply that B » B(i) » x - contradiction. Thus, since k ¸ 2 pick any yj 6= y1, say,
and note that (i) x;y1 2 B(j)¤ and (ii) x 6»B(j)¤ y1. Finally, observe that B¤ µ B(j)¤ [ yj.
Thus, Strong Reduction implies that B(j)¤ [ yj » B. On the other hand, if x 6»B(j)¤[yj yj,
then Consistency implies that x 6»B(j)¤[yj z;8z 2 B(j)¤ with x Â z so that B(j)¤[yj º x -
contradiction. Thus, x »B(j)¤[yj yj. Iteratively deleting elements of B(j)¤ [ yjnfx;yjg and
applying Consistency we obtain x »fx;yjg yj, which implies that x »A[yj yj. It follows that
for every x Â y1, there is some yi with yi 2 Cx(A) implying that UC(B) · U(B).
Case 3: y1 Â xB.
Let §(y1) = fxi 2 A : A(i) Â A(i)[y1g and note that if y1 Â xB, then for each xi 2 §(y1),
there must be yj 2 B2 such that xi »A[yj yj. Check this via contradiction, say that there
is some xi 2 §(y1) such that xi 6»A[yj yj;8yj 6= y1. Note that xi Â y1 Â xB so that IB(xi)
is not singleton and xi Â inf(IB(xi)). Put D := [x:xiºBx IB(x) and set D0 := D¤ [xi. Note
that by Consistency we have inf(IB(xi)) 2 fy2;:::;ykg. But then, successively deleting
elements of fy2;:::;ykg \ fx : inf(IB(xi) Â xg from the menu D¤ and iteratively apply-
ing Consistency we obtain a menu ^ D = D1 [ y where D1 µ A and y = inf(IB(xi) and
xi »D1[y y. On the other hand, we assumed that xi 6»A[yi yj;8yj 2 fy2;:::;ykg - con-
tradiction. Therefore, for each xi 2 §(y1) we have Cxi(A) \ fy2;:::;ykg 6= ;. It follows
that UC(B) = UC(Bny1) = U(Bny1) = U(B). The latter two equalities following from
(respectively) the induction hypothesis and Strong Reduction.
Corollary 3.1 (Uniqueness). Let (u1(¢);A1;BA1);(u2(¢);A2;BA2) be rigid category repre-
sentations of a preference º2 P(X). Then, A1 = A2;BA1 ´ BA2, and u1(¢) and u2(¢) are
ordinally equivalent.
Proof. Let º denote the preference represented by the rigid category model (u1(¢);A1;BA1).
If (u2;A2;BA2) is another category that represents º then note that A2 is a maximal simple
subset. Let A1 := fz1;:::;zkg be a top-down enumeration of the elements of A1. Let
Dzi 2 BA1 denote the unique neighborhood that contains zi. Let fx1;:::;xlg be a top-down
enumeration of elements of A2. Note that since A2 is simple, for each xi 2 A2 there must be
some neighborhood Dxi 2 BA1 such that (i) xi 2 Dxi, and (ii) xj = 2 Dxi for all xj Á xi. By
maximality of A2, it follows that jA2j = jA1j and that the collection of neighborhoods Dxi is
exactly BA1. Re-label the elements of A2 = fx1;:::;xkg such that xi 2 Dzi. Representability
then implies that Cxi(A2) µ Dzi. I claim that zi = xi;8i = 1;2;:::;k. Proceed by induction
on i. If zk Â xk, since X = [i Cxi(A2) we must have zk 2 Cxi(A2) for some i < k.
Since Cxi(A2) µ Dzi this implies zk 2 Dzi - a contradiction. Inductively assume that
zi+1 = xi+1;8i + 1 ¸ m, where 2 · m · k. If zi Â xi, then since zj = xj;8j > i by the
induction hypothesis and zi Â zj;8j > i we must have zi 2 Cxn(A2) for some n < i (again,
since X = [i Cxi(A2)). Since Cxn(A2) µ Dzn this implies zi 2 Dzn - contradiction. Thus,
zi = xi;8i implying that A1 = A2. Finally, observe that BA1 ´ fCzi(A1)g so that A1 = A2
implies that BA1 ´ BA2.
From our perspective, one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the above characterization
result is the fact that the set of `commitments' A that form the top-ranked elements of
19the elements of the rigid category DA are not subjectively derived, but rather, exogenously
speci¯ed in the de¯nition of the Consistency Axiom. Ideally, we would like to derive all
parameters of the category subjectively. Towards this end, consider the following strength-
ening of the Consistency Axiom,
Axiom 3: (Strong Consistency) Let B be simple and x;y 2 B. If x 6»B[z z, then x 6»B[z y.
Recall the following axiom, used in the characterization of the partition model.
Axiom 3a: If x Â y Â z and x !t z;x !t y, then y !t z.
Introduce the following specialization of the rigid category model,
De¯nition 10: Let (u(¢);C) be a category, where C = fCig has the following additional
properties:
1. C = fCig is not necessarily non-redundant.
2. If x 2 C1 \ C2, then fy 2 C1 : x º yg = fy 2 C2 : x º yg.
Call a pair (u(¢);C) where C satis¯es these properties a narrow category.
Note that the narrow category model nests the partition model. We have the following
characterization:
Theorem 3.2. A preference º2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axioms 1¤;2¤;3a, and 3 if and only if it
admits a narrow category representation.
Proof. Necessity of Axiom 3
Let (u(¢);C) be a representing narrow category and let º denote the underlying preference.
Let B be simple with x;y 2 B (say x Â y). Then, for each z 2 B there is a neighborhood
Cz 2 C such that Cz \ B µ fz0 : z0 º zg. Consider the menu B [ z and assume that
x 6»B[z z. If z Â x, then this automatically implies that x 6»B[z y. If x Â z and z = 2 Cx,
then again we have x 6»B[z y. Thus, consider the possibility that x Â z and z 2 Cx. Since
C is a narrow category and if x 2 Ci for any other Ci 2 C, then we must have z 2 Ci as
well. Thus, if z 2 Cx, then we must have umin(x;B [ z) = u(z), implying that x »B[z z -
contradiction. Thus, we must have z = 2 Cx, implying that x 6»B[z y.
Necessity of Axiom 3a
Let (u(¢);C) be a representing narrow category and say that x Â y Â z with x !t y and
x !t z. Note that this implies that whenever x 2 Ci, then we must have y 2 Ci and z 2 Ci.
To show that y !t z it su±ces to show that z 2 Cj whenever y 2 Cj. Thus, let Cj be a
neighborhood that contains y. Let Ci contain x and note that we must have y;z 2 Ci. Since
the category is narrow we must then have, fz0 2 Ci : y º z0g = fz0 2 Cj : y º z0g. Thus,
z 2 Cj so that y !t z.
20Su±ciency
The argument parallels the proof for Theorem 3.1, so we only °esh out the details in the
parts where there is signi¯cant deviation in the proofs. Let X = fx1 Â ¢¢¢ Â xkg and let
A be a maximal simple set that contains x1. For each xi 2 A de¯ne a neighborhood of xi
as follows. Note that for each y 2 XnA we have either (by Lemma 3.3) (i) A(i) [ y » A(i)
for some A(i) Á y or (ii) A(i) Â A(i) [ y for some A(i) Â y. First, observe that these are
mutually exclusive cases. To see this note that, arguing as in Theorem 3.1 (which uses only
the latter half of the Consistency Axiom), the unique non-singleton ºA[y class of A [ y
is IA[y(y). Thus, consider the two cases (i) inf(IA[y(y)) = y and (ii) y Â inf(IA[y(y)). In
the latter case, I claim that A(i) » A(i) [ y for all A(i) Â y. To see this simply note that
IA[y(y) = fxy;yg in the case that y Â inf(IA[y(y)). Thus, if xi Â y then xi ÂA[y y so that
xi ÂA(i)[y y. Moreover, note that if IA[y(y) = fy Â xyg then we have A(xy)) [ y » A(xy).
In the case where y = inf(IA[y(y)) I claim that A(i) [ y » y whenever y Â xi. To see
this, put A0 := fyg [ [z:yÂA[yz IA[y(z) and note that for any xi with y Â xi we have
A(i) [ y µ A0. It follows that umin(y;A(i) [ y) ¸ umin(y;A0) = u(y). Thus, y » A(i) [ y.
Moreover, note that if xi 2 IA[y(y), then by (Weak) Consistency we have xi »fxi;yg y.
Thus, A(i) Â A(i) [ y. This completes the argument for the mutual exclusivity of the
alternatives. Put ¦1 := fy 2 XnA : A(x) Â A(x) [ yg;¦2 := fy 2 XnA : y Â A(x) [ yg.
Now de¯ne a category as follows. For each xi 2 A de¯ne
Cx(A) := fxg [ fy 2 XnA : A(x) Â A(x) [ yg [ fy 2 XnA : y Â A(x) [ yg
and let C := fCx(A)gx2A. I claim that (i) the collection C is a narrow category, and (ii) the
function UC(¢) is a representation of º.
Claim 3.6. The collection C := Cxi(A) is a narrow category.
Proof. I need to show that for any x;x0 2 A with y 2 Cx(A) \ Cx0(A) we have fz 2
Cx(A) : y º zg = fz 2 Cx0(A) : y º zg. Note ¯rst that if y 2 Cx(A) \ Cx0(A), then we
must have x Â y;x0 Â y. This follows from the remarks preceding the statement of the
claim. Put £1 := fz 2 Cx(A) : y º zg;£2 := fz 2 Cx0(A) : y º zg and let z 2 £1.
Then, x »A[z z. Iterative application of Consistency (and Strong Reduction) then yields
that x »fx;zg z. Thus, x !t z. Since x »A[y y, the same argument implies x !t y.
Thus, by Axiom 3a, y !t z. Since y 2 £2 we also have x0 !t y. Since Axioms 1¤ and
2¤ together imply the Reduction Axiom, Lemma 2.2 then implies that x0 !t z. Thus,
umin(x0;A(x0) [ z) · u(z) < u(x0) implying that z 2 Cx0(A). Thus, £1 µ £2. A symmetric
argument shows the reverse containment.
I now check that the category model UC(¢) represents º. Proceed in the same fashion as the
proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that we have the following facts: (the notation and arguments
are identical to the ones given in the proof of Theorem 3.1)
² Cx(A) = Cx(B);8B µ A.
² UC(B [ y) = U(B [ y);8B µ A;y 2 XnA (here we take B to be A-saturated).
21To complete the representability argument proceed by induction as before. Put B = B1tB2,
where B2 = fy1 Â ¢¢¢ykg and assume that we have shown UC(B) = U(B) whenever
jB2j · k ¡ 1. Break into three cases, (i) xB Â y1, (ii) xB = y1, and (iii) y1 Â xB.
Case 1: xB Â y1.
Sub-case (i): fy1;:::;ykg 6µ B¤.
Find yi 2 B2 such that Bnyi ¶ B¤ and note that, by the induction hypothesis and Strong
Reduction, UC(Bnyi) = U(Bnyi) = U(B). Since yi = 2 B¤, put zi(6= yi) = inf(IB(yi)). It-
erative application of Strong Consistency and Strong Reduction yields yi »fyi;zig zi. Now
consider two cases, (i) yi 2 ¦1 and (ii) yi 2 ¦2. In the latter case, note that by Axiom 3a
(and simplicity of A) there is a unique xyi with yi 2 Cxyi(A). Thus, if zi 2 A then zi = xyi
is forced. If zi = 2 A and xyi Â zi, then by Axiom 3a we have xyi !t zi. If zi = 2 A and
zi Â xyi, then by Axiom 3a zi !t xyi. In all cases, we obtain that zi 2 Cxyi(A) which
implies that minz2B\Cxyi u(z) · u(zi) < u(yi). Thus, UC(B) = UC(Bnyi) = U(B) in the
case where yi 2 ¦2. If yi 2 ¦1, then for any x 2 A with yi 2 Cx(A) we have x !t yi. Since
yi !t zi, by Lemma 2.2, we have x !t zi implying that zi 2 Cx(A) whenever yi 2 Cx(A).
Thus, UC(B) = UC(Bnyi) = U(Bnyi) = U(B).
Sub-case (ii): fy1;:::;ykg µ B¤.
Note that for any x Â xB we have (again, by iterative (Weak) Consistency and Strong
Reduction) inf(IB(x)) 2 B2. Thus, for each x Â xB we have minz2B\Cx(A) u(z) · u(y1) <
u(xB). It follows that UC(B) · u(xB) = U(B). For the reverse inequality, note that since
CxB(B) = CxB(A) we have CxB(A)\B = fxBg. Thus, minz2B\CxB(A) u(z) = u(xB) implying
that UC(B) ¸ u(xB) = U(B).
Case 2: xB = y1.
First note that as above we may check that for any x Â y1 we have yi 2 Cx(A) for some
yi 2 B2. Thus, UC(B) · u(y1) = U(B). For the reverse inequality consider the two cases,
(i) y1 2 ¦1 and (ii) y1 2 ¦2. In the latter case, let xy1 denote that unique element of A
such that y1 2 Cxy1(A). I claim that B\Cxy1(A) = fy1g. Otherwise, if xy1 2 B then clearly
we cannot have xB = y1. If there is some yi(6= y1) 2 B \ Cxy1(A), then xy1 !t yi so that
by Lemma 2.2 y1 !t yi - contradicting the fact that xB = y1. Thus, B \ Cxy1(A) = fy1g
implying that minz2B\Cxy1(A) u(z) = u(y1). It follows that UC(B) ¸ u(y1) = U(B).
Case 3: y1 Â xB.
Note that UC(Bny1) = U(Bny1) = U(B) by (resp.) the induction hypothesis and Strong
Reduction. We check that in fact UC(B) = UC(Bny1). To see this consider the two cases,
(i) y1 2 ¦1 and (ii) y1 2 ¦2. Put zy1 = inf(IB(y1)). In the latter case, if either zy1 = xy1
or zy1 2 XnA then we obtain (by Axiom 3a in the second situation) zy1 2 Cxy1(A). Thus,
UC(B) = UC(Bny1). In the case y1 2 ¦1 note that by Lemma 2.2 we have zy1 2 Cx(A)
whenever y1 2 Cx(A). Thus, we obtain UC(B) = UC(Bny1).
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the category pair (u(¢);C) we cannot mutatis mutandis apply the uniqueness result for the
rigid category model. Nevertheless, the category used in the su±ciency construction above
turns out to be non-redundant. This suggests that the narrow category model satis¯es the
following weak form of uniqueness. Let º(u;C) denote the underlying preference represented
by a pair (u(¢);C).
De¯nition 11: A category (u(¢);C) is called sharp if for any complete sub-category C0 µ C
we have º(u;C)6=º(u;C0).
Let (u(¢);C¤) denote the narrow category constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.2 above.
Corollary 3.2. (Uniqueness) Assume that (u1(¢);C1);(u2(¢);C2) are two narrow category
representations of a preference º2 P
0(X) and assume C1 and C2 are sharp. Then, u1(¢)
and u2(¢) are ordinally equivalent and C1 ´ C2.
Proof. Let A = fx1 Â ¢¢¢xkg denote a maximal simple set that contains x1 and put
zi := sup(Cxi(A)). Note that A0 := fz1;z2;:::;zkg is also maximal and simple. To see this
¯rst check simplicity. If there is some zi with IA0(zi) = zj Á zi, then by Strong Consistency
we must have zi !t zj. Note that this implies zj = 2 A. Thus, zi = 2 A. But then we obtain, on
the one hand, zi !t xi 2 A. On the other hand, zi !t zj !t xj 2 A so that zi !t xj. Thus,
if say xi Â xj, then Axiom 3a implies that xi !t xj - contradicting simplicity of A. To check
the maximality claim, note that X = [zi (fzig [ Bt(zi)). Thus, if z = 2 fz1;:::;zkg, then
there is some zi with zi !t z implying that A [ z is not simple. Thus, we can equivalently
write the category fCxi(A)g as ffzig [ Bt(zi)gi. Put C(i) := fzig [ Bt(zi) and consider the
category C1. Also re-label the zi if necessary such that we have zi Â zj whenever i < j. I
claim that, for each zi, there is some Ci
1 such that Ci
1 = C(i). First check this for i = 1,
via contradiction. Say that for each C1(j) with z1 2 C1(j) we have C(1) ( C1(j). Then, for
each j ¯nd bj 2 C1(j)nC(1) and consider the menu B(1) := fbjgj [ fz1g. Since z1 Â bj;8bj
representability implies that z1 = 2 B(1)¤. But this implies, by iterative application of
Strong Reduction and Strong Consistency, that z1 !t bj, for some bj 2 C1(j)nC(1) -
contradiction (since Bt(z1) µ C(1)). Now consider C(2). Apply the same argument. I
claim that there is some C2
1 with C(2) = C2
1. Otherwise, for each C1(j) with z2 2 C1(j) we
have C(2) ( C1(j). For each such j select any bj 2 C1(j)nC(2). Note that if z2 Â bj;8bj,
then putting B(2) := fz2g [ fbjgj we ¯nd z2 Â B(2). Thus, z2 !t bj for some bj -
contradiction. If bj Â z2 for some bj, then bj 2 C(1). Since the category (u(¢);C1) is narrow
this implies fx 2 C(1) : bj º xg = fx 2 C1(j) : bj º xg. As z2 2 fx 2 C1(j) : bj º xg we
obtain z2 2 C(1), implying that z1 !t z2 - contradiction. Inductively assume that we have
shown that C(i) 2 C1;8i · n ¡ 1. Now claim that C(n) 2 C1. Otherwise, for each C1(j)
with zn 2 C1(j) there is some bj = 2 C(n). Pick any such bj for each C1(j) with zn 2 C1(j)
and consider the menu B(n) := fbjgj [ fzng. If zn Â bj;8bj, then by representability
zn Â Bn. Thus, zn !t bj, for some bj - contradiction. If there is some bj with bj Â zn,
then bj 2 [
n¡1
i=1 C(i), say bj 2 C(in). By the induction hypothesis, C(in) 2 C1. Thus, since
(u1(¢);C1) is a narrow category we have fx 2 C(in) : bj º xg = fx 2 C1(j) : bj º xg. Since
zn 2 fx 2 C1(j) : bj º xg it follows that zn 2 C(in), implying that zin !t zn - contradicting
23simplicity of A0. It follows that for all i = f1;2;:::;kg the sets C(k) 2 C1. Note that
C0 := fC(i)gk
i=1 is then a complete sub-category of C1 and, by the su±ciency argument in
the proof of Theorem 3.2, (u1(¢);C0) represents º. By sharpness, it follows that C0 = C1.
The above characterization doesn't quite attain the goal of ¯nding a category model
that satis¯es the Strong Consistency condition since we have introduced a model that re-
quires an additional axiom, Axiom 3a. It is therefore natural to seek a characterization of
a more general category model that satis¯es the Strong Consistency condition. Towards
this end, introduce the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 12: Let (u(¢);C) be a category model where C := fCig satis¯es the follow-
ing additional properties:
1. C = fCigi is not necessarily non-redundant.
2. If x 2 C1 \ C2, then either fz 2 C1 : x º zg µ fz 2 C2 : x º zg or fz 2 C2 : x º zg µ
fz 2 C1 : x º zg.
Call a pair (u(¢);C) that satis¯es these properties a strongly consistent category.
For brevity, let (¡1;x] denote the order interval fz0 2 X : x º z0g. Introduce the
following two axioms,
Axiom 3¤¤: Let B be simple. If x 6»B[z z and y 6»B[z z, then x 6»B[z y.
Axiom 4¤: If z 2 Bt(x) \ Bt(y), then either (i) (¡1;z] \ Bt(x) µ Bt(y) or (ii) (¡1;z] \
Bt(y) µ Bt(x).
It is a simple exercise to check that Axiom 2 (Reduction) and Axiom 3a together im-
ply Axiom 4¤. The following Theorem provides the most general representation result for
a category model that satis¯es the Consistency Axiom.
Theorem 3.3. A preference º2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axioms 1¤;2¤;3¤¤, and 4¤ if and only if
it admits a representation by a strongly consistent category.
Proof. Necessity of Axiom 3¤¤
Assume (u(¢);C) is a strongly consistent category model with underlying preference º and
let B be a simple set with x;y 2 B (say x Â y). Let z 2 X and assume that x 6»B[z z.
If z Â x, then we clearly have x 6»B[z y since there must be some set Cx 2 C with y = 2 Cx
and inf(Cx \ B) = x. Let §x := fCi 2 C : inf(Ci \ B) = xg. I claim that if x Â z, then the
hypothesis that x 6»B[z z implies that there must be some C¤ 2 §x with z = 2 C¤. Note that if
we show this, then it automatically follows that x 6»B[z y. Towards contradiction, say that
z 2 Ci;8Ci 2 §x. Then, since x 6»B[z z there must be some C0 2 C with inf(C0\(B[z)) Â z
and x 2 C0. Since C is a strongly consistent category, for any Ci 2 §x we must have either
(i) fz0 2 Ci : x º z0g µ fz0 2 C0 : x º z0g or (ii) fz0 2 C0 : x º z0g µ fz0 2 Ci : x º z0g. In
the latter case we have, x Â inf(B\Ci) (note that x 2 C0 = 2 §x) - contradicting the fact that
Ci 2 §x. Thus, for each Ci 2 §x the former case must hold. Since z 2 fz0 2 Ci : x º z0g we
24obtain that z 2 C0 - contradicting the assumption that inf(C0 \ (B [ z)) Â z.
Necessity of Axiom 4¤
Let z 2 Bt(x) \ Bt(y) (say x Â y) and let §x := fCi 2 C : x 2 Cig;§y := fCj 2 C : y 2 Cjg.
De¯ne a relation º¤ on elements of §x;§y by: (say C1;C2 2 §x)
C1 º¤ C2 if and only if (¡1;z] \ C1 ¶ (¡1;z] \ C2
Since C is a strongly consistent category it follows that º¤ induces a total order on (resp.)
§x and §y. Let C¤(x);C¤(y) denote º¤-minimal elements within (resp.) §x;§y. Note
that if y 2 C¤(x), then (¡1;z] \ Bt(y) µ (¡1;z] \ C¤(x). By º¤-minimality of C¤(x)
this implies that (¡1;z] \ Bt(y) µ (¡1;z] \ Ci;8Ci 2 §x. Thus, by representabil-
ity, (¡1;z] \ Bt(y) µ Bt(x). The same argument applies if x 2 C¤(y). Thus, assume
that x = 2 C¤(y);y = 2 C¤(x). Since z 2 Bt(x) \ Bt(y) we must have z 2 C¤(x) \ C¤(y).
Since C is a strongly consistent category, this implies either (i) fz0 2 C¤(x) : z º z0g µ
fz0 2 C¤(y) : z º z0g or (ii) fz0 2 C¤(y) : z º z0g µ fz0 2 C¤(x) : z º z0g. In
the latter case, Bt(y) \ (¡1;z] µ C¤(x). Since C¤(x) is º¤-minimal this implies that
Bt(y) \ (¡1;z] µ Ci;8Ci 2 §x. Thus, Bt(y) \ (¡1;z] µ Bt(x). If (i) is true, then the
symmetric argument gives Bt(x) \ (¡1;z] µ Bt(y).
Su±ciency
Let A be any maximal simple subset of X and put A = fx1 Â ¢¢¢ Â xkg. The same
dichotomy on elements of XnA described in the proof of Theorem 3.3 applies here. That
is, put ¦1 = fy 2 XnA : 9xy 2 A;A(xy) Â A(xy) [ yg;¦2 = fy 2 XnA : 9xy 2 A;y Â
A(xy) [ yg. For each y 2 ¦2 let xy = inf(IA[y(y)) and note that xy = inffx 2 A : x !t yg.
De¯ne categories as follows: for each x 2 A put
Cxi(A) := fxig [ fy 2 ¦1 : A(xi) Â A(xi) [ yg
and for each y 2 XnA put
Cy(A) := fyg [ Bt(y)
Note that the category C ´ fCz(A)gz2A is strongly consistent since for each z 2 A we have
Cz(A) = fzg [ Bt(z), so that strong consistency follows immediately from Axiom 4¤. For
the representability claim, note that by the identical arguments as in the proof of Theorem
3.1 we obtain the following facts (notation follows the proof of Theorem 3.1):
² Cx(A) = Cx(B) for any B µ A.
² U(B [ y) = UC(B [ y) (for any A-saturated set B µ A)
Inductively assume that the representability claim has been checked for all B = B1 t B2,
where B1 µ A;B2 µ XnA and jB2j · k ¡ 1 and consider B with B2 = fy1 Â ¢¢¢ Â ykg.
Break into 3 cases, (i) xB Â y1, (ii) xB = y1, and (iii) y1 Â xB.
Case 1: xB Â y1.
Sub-case (i): fy1;¢¢¢;ykg 6µ B¤
25Find Bi = Bnyi such that B¤ µ Bi and note that U(B) = U(Bnyi). By the induction
hypothesis, UC(Bnyi) = U(Bnyi). Moreover, since yi = 2 B¤ we have yi Â inf(IB(yi)) := zi.
By Axiom 3¤¤ it follows that yi »fyi;zig zi. Thus, for any set Cz(A) = fzg [ Bt(z) with
yi 2 Cz(A) we must also have zi 2 Cz(A). It follows that UC(B) = UC(Bnyi) so that
UC(B) = U(B) in this case.
Sub-case (ii): fy1;¢¢¢;ykg µ B¤
This sub-case follows verbatim the argument for the corresponding part of Theorem 3.1,
we repeat merely for completeness. Take any x 2 B with x Â xB. Since x = 2 B¤;9z 2 B¤
with z = inf(IB(x)). By the same arguments as above, this implies x !t z (also note
that z 2 XnA) so that z 2 Cx(A). It follows that for each x 2 B with x Â xB we have
minz2B\Cx(A) u(z) < u(xB). Thus, UC(B) · U(B). To show the reverse inequality, observe
that U(B) = umin(xB;B) · minyi2B2 umin(xB;B1[yi) = minz2B\CxB(A) u(z) (the last equal-
ity uses the fact that Cx(A) = Cx(B)).
Case 2: xB = y1.
Note that we must have Bt(y1) \ B = fy1g. Thus, UC(B) ¸ u(y1) = U(B). To show the
reverse inequality, note that for each x 2 B with x Â y1 we have x Â inf(IB(x)) 2 B2.
Thus, for each such x we have minz2B\Cx(A) u(z) · u(y2). Thus, UC(B) · u(y1) = U(B).
Case 3: y1 Â xB.
Note that B¤ µ Bny1. Thus, U(B) = U(Bny1) = UC(Bny1). As before let z1 = inf(IB(y1))
and note that we must have y1 »fy1;z1g z1. Thus, for any Cz(A) with y1 2 Cz(A) we must
also have z1 2 Cz(A), implying that UC(B) = UC(Bny1).
Note that if a preference º2 P
0(X) admits a rank-based representation (u(¢);L(¢)),
then it satis¯es Axioms 1¤;2¤;3¤¤, and 4¤. It is easy to check that the pair (u(¢);L(¢) satisfy
1¤;2¤;3¤. To see that it also satis¯es 4¤ let z 2 Bt(x) \ Bt(y) and say that L(x) > L(y). It
follows that whenever z0 2 (¡1;z] \ Bt(y), then L(z0) < L(y) < L(x) so that z0 2 Bt(x).
Thus, (¡1;z] \ Bt(y) µ (¡1;z] \ Bt(x) and Axiom 4¤ is satis¯ed. It follows that the
strongly consistent utility nests all strict rank-based models, and hence, all Strotz utilities
where the normative ranking u(¢) is strict. As a consequence of this, Example 3.1 shows
that there are preferences that satisfy all of Axioms 1¤;2¤;3¤¤, and 4¤ that do not admit
non-redundant category model representations. Thus, the `not necessarily non-redundant'
property in the de¯nition of the strongly consistent category cannot be dispensed.
Since categories are generalizations of partitions, it follows from the representation re-
sults that Axioms 1, 2, and 3a, 3b must together imply Axioms 1¤ and 2¤. However, we can
deduce a sharper implication. In particular, one would like to precisely identify the subset
of axioms among the set 1, 2, 3a, and 3b that imply Axioms 1¤ and 2¤. The following
lemmas carry out this exercise.
Lemma 3.4. Axiom 10 and Axiom 2 together imply Axiom 1¤.
Proof. Observe that Axioms 10 ¡ 2 imply that 9x 2 A such that x » A. Put B µ A with
x 2 B. We claim that B º A. To see this note that if 6 9y 2 B with x !t y, then x 2 B0 -
26the maximal temptation-free subset of B. Thus, B » B0 » sup(B0) º x » A.
Proposition 3.4. Axiom 10 and Axiom 2 together imply Axiom 2¤.
Proof. Fix a menu A and put A¤ = [i inf(Ii
A), where fIi
Agi denotes the collection of ºA
indi®erence classes. We claim that A¤ is the maximal temptation-free subset of A, from
which Axiom 2¤ follows. First, observe that A¤ is temptation-free: Else if 9x;y 2 A¤
with x !t y, then x ÂA¤ y - which contradicts the fact that x 2 inf(Ii
A);y 2 inf(I
j
A)
(for i < j). Next, we verify that A¤ is the maximal temptation-free subset of A. Towards
contradiction, say that A¤ is not maximal so that there is some x1 2 AnA¤ such that A¤[x1
is temptation-free. Since AnA¤ is ¯nite, choose a º-minimal x1 with the property that
A¤ [ x1 is temptation-free. For brevity put [xi] := inf(IAi). Note that x1 2 [k¸i Ik
A, where
x1 = 2 [xk];8k. Then, by Axioms 10 and 2, there must be some x2 2 [k¸i Ik
A with x1 !t x2.
Since A¤ [ x1 is alleged to be temptation-free we must have x2 = 2 A¤. Now observe that
A¤ [ x2 is temptation-free. By de¯nition of A¤, for any x 2 A¤, we cannot have x !t x2:
Else, this implies that u(x;A) · U(fx2g). On the other hand, if x2 2 Ii
A;x 2 I
j
A where
[xi] Â x and i > j then we must have u(x;A) = U(x) > U(fx2g) - contradiction. Moreover,
if x2 !t x for some x 2 A¤, then x1 !t x2 !t x, which implies (by Lemma 2.2) that
x1 !t x - contradicting the fact that A¤ [ x1 is allegedly temptation-free. Thus, A¤ [ x2 is
temptation-free - contradicting the º-minimality of x1.
By the above results, we obtain the narrow category model from the partition model pre-
cisely by replacing Axiom 3b with the Strong Consistency Axiom. Now turn to the represen-
tation result for the full category-based model. For a maximal simple set A := fx1;:::;xkg
introduce the notation ^ Aj(i) := fxi;xi+1;:::;xj¡1;xj+1;:::;xkg and for each z 2 XnA ¯nd
the º-maximal xi such that z º A(i) [ z (assuming one exists) and for any such z put
§z := fxj 2 A : z » ^ Aj(i) [ zg. By Lemma 3.3, the condition z Â A(i) [ z can only hold
when z Â sup(A(i)). Thus, we may think of the menu A(i) as `tempting' the potential com-
mitment element z. Since this represents an aggregated self-control problem (i.e. the menu
A(i), as opposed to some singleton element, tempts z), the set §z identi¯es the components
of the self-control problem. Also recall the notation §(z) from the proof of Theorem 3.1,
§(z) = fxi 2 A : A(i) Â A(i) [ zg. Say that an element z 2 XnA is A-tempted if there is
some xi with z Â A(i)[z » A(i). Consider the following replacement for Axiom 3¤. Recall
the notation xD denotes an equivalent for the menu D.
Axiom 30: There is a maximal simple menu A such that
1. Weak Consistency:
² If B is simple and x 6»B[z z (where x 2 B \ A), then x 6»B[z y for all y 2 B
with x Â y.
² If z is not A-tempted and z » B [ z, then there is a B0 ¶ B with B0 » B and
IB0(z) \ A 6= ;.
2. Temptation Aggregation:
² If z is A-tempted, then z » B [ z if and only if §z 6µ B [
S
z0:zÂz0 (§z0 [ §(z0)).
27The reader should think of this as two separate axioms. We have lumped together the
Aggregation statement with the Consistency condition since they are both linked by the
existence of a common maximal simple menu A that satis¯es both properties. Also note
that the Consistency axiom required that x 6»B[z y whenever x 6»B[z z. Weak Consistency
relaxes this to the requirement that x 6»B[z y only if x Â y. The Linear Aggregation Axiom
puts structure on the manner in which self-control problems aggregate. First, it requires
that all the elements, §z, of the self-control problem need to be in place for z to be tempted
by the menu A(i). We call this `linear aggregation' since all components of §z are implicitly
weighted equally under this restriction. Second, elements of XnA that tempt any xi 2 §z
can also tempt z (call these `second-order' temptations). Thus, if z 2 B and z » B the
Aggregation property requires that (i) not all ¯rst-order temptations are present, and (ii)
the ¯rst-order temptations not in B cannot be replaced by second-order temptations if we
wish to obtain z » B.
Theorem 3.4. A preference º2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axioms 1¤, 2¤, and 30 if and only if it
admits a representation by the category model.
The proof of this Theorem is similar to the one given for the rigid category model, hence
is relegated to the appendix.
Corollary 3.3. (Uniqueness) Let (u1;C1);(u2;C2) denote two category models that represent
a given º2 P(X). Then, C1 ´ C2 and u1 and u2 are ordinally equivalent.
Proof. Note that for each C(i) 2 C1;9xi 2 C(i)n([j6=i C(j)). Let A1 := fxig. Note that
A1 is a maximal simple set. It follows that for each xi 2 A1 there is some C2(i) such
that (i) xi 2 C2(i), and (ii) xj = 2 C2(i);8xj s.t. xi Â xj. Moreover, representability
implies that Cxi(A1) µ C2(i) for each xi 2 C2(i). Since C2 is a category, by non-redundance
choose a collection xi 2 C2(i)n([j6=i C2(j)) and put A2 := fxig (note that jC1j = jC2j,
so that jA1j = jA2j). I ¯rst claim that C1 ´ fCxi(A1)g and C2 ´ fCxi(A2)g. To show
this check the ¯rst equality of categories, the argument for C2 is identical. Label C1(xi)
as the unique neighborhood that contains xi. Clearly we must have Cxi(A1) µ C1(xi).
Note that C1(xi)nxi µ XnA1. Representability then implies that Cxi(A1) = C1(xi). Thus, if
Cxi(A1) µ C2(xj) and C2(xj) µ Cxjk(A1) for some xjk 2 A1, then we have Cxi(A1) µ Cxjk(A1).
Non-redundance then implies Cxi(A1) = Cxjk(A1) so that Cxi(A1) = Cxj(A2). It follows that
the categories are identical.
The following Theorem is the representation result for the local category model. The
result also generalizes the strict rank-based utility representation, when the ordinal ranking
u(¢) in the pair (u(¢);L(¢)) is strict.
Theorem 3.5. A preference º2 P
0(X) satis¯es Axiom 1¤ if and only if it admits a local
category representation.
Proof. Necessity of Axiom 1¤ follows trivially from (i) the fact that u(¢) is strict, and (ii)
the fact that the system of local categories, fDAg, is coherent. Consider the following
candidate category. Fix a menu A and let I1
A;:::;Ik
A be a top-down enumeration of the ºA
indi®erence classes. For any menu B, let Ix
B denote the º indi®erence class of x 2 B and
28let IA(x) = [Ix
B where the union is taken over all sets B such that (i) B µ A, and (ii)
x 2 CE(B). Inductively de¯ne a sequence of sets as follows. Put
D
i
A(1) :=
[
x2Ii
A
IA(x)
and let
D
i
A(k) :=
[
x2Di
A(k¡1)
IA(x)
Note that Di
A(k) µ Di
A(k+1) so that the sequence terminates. Let Di
A denote the terminal
element for each i and let BA ´ fDi
Ag be the candidate category. We claim that the sys-
tem BA is a coherent category such that (u(¢);BA) represents º. Completeness is obvious
from de¯nition, so that it remains to check coherence, non-redundance and representability.
Coherence
Let B µ A. We wish to show that for any Di
B, there is some j such that Di
B µ D
j
A.
Note that once we obtain Di
B(n) µ D
j
A(m) for any integers m ¸ n, then it follows that
Di
B(n + 1) µ D
j
A(m + 1), and so on; so that Di
B µ D
j
A. Now let x 2 inf(Ii
B) and note that
IB(x) µ D
j
A(1) for some j with x 2 I
j
A by completeness. Thus, Di
B(1) µ D
j
A(2).
Representability
Note that, from the preceding proposition, inf(Ix
B) » x whenever x 2 CE(B). Thus,
minx2Di
A(1) u(x) = minx2Ii
A u(x). Applying the same reasoning to each Di
A(n) we ¯nd
minx2Di
A(n) u(x) = minx2Di
A(n¡1) u(x) = ¢¢¢ = minx2Ii
A u(x)
It follows that, for each i, inf(Di
A) = inf(Ii
A). Fix some xi 2 inf(Ii
A). Since I1
A Â I2
A Â ¢¢¢ Â
Ik
A (by the preceding lemma), we obtain UBA(A) = maxi fu(x1);:::;u(xk)g = u(x1) = U(A).
Non-Redundance
We claim that if x 2 inf(Ik
A), then x = 2 D
j
A for any j 6= k. Towards contradiction, let
x 2 inf(Ik
A) \ D
j
A. Thus, x 2 I
y
B for some y 2 D
j
A(n) where x = 2 D
j
A(n). Note that by
the preceding Proposition we must have y 2 Ii
A for some i > k. Moreover, if x Â y then
B µ A and y » B Á x, contradicting the fact that u(x;A) = U(fxg). Thus, x » y which
by strictness of the singleton ranking implies x = y - a contradiction.
We now give some examples to concretely illustrate the construction of the categories
in the proof of the Theorem.
Example 3.2. Denote certainty equivalents of menus with an underscore. De¯ne a pref-
erence as follows:
² X = fx1 Â x2 Â x3g
² fx1;x2g;fx2;x3g;fx1;x3g.
29Put A1 = fx1;x2g;A2 = fx2;x3g;A3 = fx1;x3g and note that BA1 = ffx1g;fx2gg;BA2 =
ffx2g;fx3gg;BA3 = A3. Moreover, we have BX = ffx1;x2g;fx1;x3gg. Note that there two
ºX indi®erence classes with inf
1
X = fx2g;inf
2
X = fx3g.
For the second example we compute the categories BA generated by a rank-based pref-
erence. Note that since Axiom 10 implies Axiom 1¤ we know that all rank-based preferences
admit representations by a category-based utility. For notational clarity we assume that
the singleton ranking, º jX, is strict.
Proposition 3.5. Let (u(¢);L(¢)) be a rank-based pair (with u(¢) strict). Then, for a given
menu A, the category fDi
Agi is described as follows: (put xi := inf(Ii
A))
D
1
A = fy 2 A : y º x
ig;D
2
A = fy 2 AnI
1
A : y º x
2g;¢¢¢;D
i
A = fy 2 An([j·i¡1 I
j
A) : y º x
ig
Moreover, the category-based pair (u(¢);fDAg) is such that UBA(A) ´ UL(A).
Proof. From the fact that CE(A) = inf(I1
A) we obtain inf(I1
A) = arg minx2A L(x). Sim-
ilarly, we have inf(Ii
A) = arg minx2Ai L(x) where we have set Ai := An([j·i¡1 I
j
A. This
implies that for a given x 2 I
j
A, L(x) · L(y);8y 2 I
j
A;j > i. Thus, Di
A ¶ fy 2 Ai : y º xig.
To show the converse, we check by induction that Di
A(n) µ fy 2 Ai : y º xig. First, we
check that Di
A(1) µ fy 2 Ai : y º xig: If y 2 Ix
B for some x 2 Ii
A (with B µ A), then
y º x by the preceding Proposition. Since x º xi we obtain y º xi. We check that y 2 Ai.
Note that L(y) ¸ L(x) since x 2 CE(B) = arg minz2B L(z). Moreover, L(x) ¸ L(xi) so
that L(y) ¸ L(xi). If y 2 Ik
A for some k < i, then fy;xig » fxig » Axi Á Ay - contra-
diction. Thus, y 2 I
j
A, for some j ¸ i so that y 2 Ai. For the inductive step assume that
Di
A(n ¡ 1) µ fy 2 Ai : y º xig. The above argument then applies verbatim, so that we
obtain Di
A(n) µ fy 2 Ai : y º xig (here we are using the fact that z º xi;8z 2 Di
A(n¡1)).
Thus, we obtain Di
A = fy 2 Ai : y º xig. To check the representability claim note that
x1 Â x2 Â ¢¢¢ Â xk by the preceding lemma, so that UBA(A) = u(x1). On the other hand,
inf(I1
A) = arg minx2A L(x) so that u(x1) = UL(A).
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new class of utilities, which we refer to as the category model, into
the decision theory literature on temptation and self-control. The aim of the category model
is two-fold. First, it provides a model of pure self-control without uncertainty. Previous
papers in the literature, GP (2005) notwithstanding, on temptation and self-control have
axiomatized utility models that con°ate the question of whether the DM has uncertainty
over ex post preferences with the question of whether the DM has a self-control problem.
The category model decouples these issues and delivers a model of pure self-control which
nests the GP (2005) Strotz utility as a special case. Second, the category model allows
us to represent a broad class of self-control problems. Namely, we have identi¯ed two
speci¯c aspects of self-control problems, respectively called multi-dimensional temptation
and temptation aggregation, that cannot be represented by the Strotz utility but admit
representation under the category model.
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315 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Note that the necessity arguments for Axioms 1¤ and 2¤ in the proof
of the representation result for the rigid category model can be applied verbatim here since
they did not invoke rigidity of the categories anywhere in the proofs. Moreover, necessity
of Axiom 30 is easy to check once we determine the maximal simple set A from the primi-
tives (u(¢);C) (this is done in the forthcoming necessity argument). Thus, we simply verify
necessity of Axiom 30.
Necessity of Axiom 30
The necessity of the ¯rst part follows easily once we ¯nd a set A and show necessity of the
second part of Weak Consistency. To see this, let (u(¢);C) denote the category model that
represents º. By non-redundance of the category, for each neighborhood Ci 2 C we can ¯nd
some xi 2 Ci such that xi = 2 [j6=i Cj. Put A := fx1;:::;xkg (and choose the labeling such
that x1 Â x2 Â ¢¢¢). I check that the (Weak) Consistency axiom holds with this choice of
A. To check the second part of the Axiom, let B be simple with x;y 2 B and x 2 B \ A.
Note that umin(x;D) = minz2D\Cx u(z) (where Cx denotes the unique Ci 2 C that contains
x) for any menu D. In particular, if x 6»B[z z, then we must have umin(x;B [ z) = u(x)
so that x 6»B[z y whenever x Â y. To check the second statement let z 2 XnA be s.t.
A(i) Â A(i) [ z. Note that, by representability, we have xj 2 §z if and only if z 2 Cxj. It
follows that if B µ X with z = sup(B), then whenever 9xj 2 §z with Cxj \B = z we must
have U(B) = u(z).
Su±ciency
The proof follows the same structure as the su±ciency argument for the rigid category
model. Let A be the maximal simple set given by Axiom 40 and put A = fx1 Â ¢¢¢ Â xkg
and set A(i) := fxi;xi+1;:::;xkg. As before, de¯ne a candidate collection of categories
as follows. For each xi 2 A put Ct
xi(A) := fy 2 XnA : A(i) Â A(i) [ yg. Note
that for any y 2 XnA we have either (i) y 2 Ct
xi(A) for some xi or (ii) A(i) º y and
A(i) [ y » A(i);8xi. Regarding the latter case, by maximality we know that A [ y is
not simple. Thus, there is some x 2 A such that y 2 IA[y(x). Since A(i) [ y º y
whenever A(i) º y, this implies that y Â inf(IA[y(x)). It follows that there is a maxi-
mal xi (and, hence, minimal index i) such that (i)y Â xi and (ii) y [ A(i) » A(i). Let
I1(y) := fxi : A(i) Â y; A(i) Â A(i) [ yg;I2(y) := fxi : y Â A(i); y » A(i) [ yg. We
claim that either I1(y) 6= ; or I2(y) 6= ; and that these are mutually exclusive alterna-
tives. That one of the two sets must be non-empty follows from the previous reasoning.
To check mutual exclusivity of the alternatives, proceed by contradiction. Pick a min-
imal xi 2 I1(y) and a minimal xj 2 I2(y). Note that xi º y º xj. It follows that
A(j)[y µ A(i)[y, so that umin(y;A(j)[y) ¸ umin(y;A(i)[y). Note that A(j)[y » A(j)
so that umin(y;A(j)[y) = u(xj) by minimality of xj (w.r.t. xj 2 I2(y)). On the other hand,
we have already seen that inf(IA(i)[y(y)) = y so that umin(y;A(i)[y) = u(y) - contradiction
(since y Â xj). Now for each y such that I2(y) 6= ; put xy := inf(I2(y)) and say that
xy = xi. Let Ty(A) = fxj 2 Ai : (Ainxj) [ y » yg and put
Cxi(A) := C
t
xi(A) [ fy 2 XnA : xi 2 Ty(A)g
32Putting C ´ fCxi(A)g the remaining claim is that the category model
U
C(D) := maxCxi(A) minz2Cxi(A)\D u(z)
represents º. As before proceed in 4 steps. First, we show that UC(A[y) = U(A[y);8y 2
XnA. Next, we show that UC(B[fy1;:::;ykg) = UC((B[fy1;:::;ykg)sat), the A-saturation
of the set B. Next, show that Ct
xi(A) = Ct
xi(B) for any B µ A. Finally, induct on the size
of fy1;:::;ykg to show that UC(B [ fy1;:::;ykg) = U(B [ fy1;:::;ykg). Respectively label
these steps: singleton temptation, saturation, reduction, and induction.
Step 1: Singleton Temptation.
Claim 5.1. For any y 2 XnA, x »A[y y if and only if y 2 Cx(A).
Proof. Consider two cases: (i) x 2 Ty(A) or (ii) y 2 Ct
x(A). In the latter case, note that
y 2 Ct
x(A) implies that umin(x;A [ y) = u(y). Conversely, assume that x »A[y y. If
x 2 Ty(A), then y 2 Cx(A) by de¯nition. Thus, we verify that if x »A[y y and x = 2 Ty(A),
then y 2 Ct
x(A). Strong Reduction implies that y = inf(IA[y(y)). Thus, if say x = xi we
obtain that A(i) Â A(i) [ y (by Strong Reduction again), implying that y 2 Ct
x(A).
Claim 5.2. U(A [ y) = UC(A [ y);8y 2 XnA.
Proof. Consider the top ºA[y - class, call it I1
A[y and let x = inf(I1
A[y). If y = 2 I1
A[y, then
by the previous claim y = 2 Cx(A) so that UC(A[y) ¸ U(A). To show the reverse inequality,
consider any z 2 X where z Â x. Note that x ºA[y z. If y 2 IA[y(x) by Strong Reduction
we obtain A » A [ y - contradiction since A º z Â x » A [ y. If y = 2 IA[y(x), then
y = 2 Cz(A) if and only if y = 2 IA[y(z). I claim this is impossible. Since z Â x » A, we have
inf(IA[y(z)) = x0 6= z. By Weak Consistency, z 6»A x0 and z 6»A[y y which implies z 6»A[y x0
- contradiction. Thus, we must have y 2 IA[y(z), so that y 2 Cz(A) for all z Â x. It follows
that UC(A [ y) · maxfu(x);u(y)g. Since sup(A) Â x and x » A [ y, Strong Reduction
implies that I1(y) 6= ; so that x Â y. It follows that UC(A [ y) · u(x) = U(A [ y).
Step 2: Saturation.
Let B be any menu and put B = B1 t B2 where B1 µ A and B2 µ XnA, and set
B2 = fy1;:::;ykg. Say that B is saturated if for each yi 2 B2 such that I1(yi) 6= ;;9x 2 B1
such that yi 2 Ct
x(A). If B is not saturated, denote by Bsat the menu constructed as
follows. For each yi with I1(yi) 6= ; pick any x(yi) 2 A with yi 2 Ct
x(yi)(A) and let
Bsat = B
S
[yi:I1(yi)6=; x(yi). Note that the saturation of a menu B is not unique. Recall
the following claim from the text which also holds in the setting of Theorem 3.2.
Claim 5.3. Let A be any maximal simple subset of X. Put fy1;:::;ykg = XnA and
for a given B µ A with x 2 B de¯ne the `neighborhoods' Ct
x(B) as before. That is, put
B(x) := fz 2 B : x º zg and say that yi 2 Ct
x(B) if and only if B(x) Â B(x) [ yi (where
x Â yi). Then, Ct
x(B) = Ct
x(A).
The proof of the claim is identical to the symmetric claim in the text (Claim 3.4). We
merely note that all that was needed in the proof of that claim was the Weak Consistency
Axiom.
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Proof. The ¯rst equality follows trivially from the de¯nition of the categories Cxi(A). Put
B(0) = Bsat \ A. To show the second equality ¯rst note that if x »A[yi yi and I1(yi) 6= ;,
then x »B(0)[yi yi (if x 2 Bsat) (by the preceding claim and Strong Reduction). It follows
that if x 2 BsatnB, then x = 2 (Bsat)¤ implying that (Bsat)¤ µ B. By Strong Reduction, it
follows that U(Bsat) = U(B).
Observe that even though the saturation of a given menu B need not be unique, by the
preceding claim we can always choose a maximal saturated menu which is unique. In what
follows, when we mention the saturation of a menu we take this to denote the maximally
saturated menu.
Step 3: Reduction.
Claim 5.5. Fix the maximal simple A as before. Let B = B1 [ y where y 2 XnA. Then,
UC(B) = U(B).
Proof. Assume WLOG that B is saturated (w.r.t A). Note that if y is such that I1(y) 6= ;,
then y 2 Ct
x(B1) if and only if y 2 Ct
x(A). Since B1 º B1 [ y º y, let xB denote an
equivalent of B and consider the cases (i) xB » B, (ii) B Â xB Â y, and (iii) xB = y. In
the ¯rst and second case, we have y = 2 Ct
x(A) so that xB 6»A[y y. Thus, UC(B) ¸ U(B).
As before, to show the reverse inequality we check that x »A[y y whenever x Â xB (and
x 2 B1). Let z = inf(IB(x)) and note that by Weak Consistency and Strong Reduction
we must have z = y. It follows that y 2 Ct
x(B1), so that y 2 Ct
x(A). It follows that
U(B) = u(xB) ¸ UC(B). The case where xB = y (and I1(y) 6= ;) is similar and left to the
reader. Now consider I2(y) 6= ;. Note that if B1 Â y, then we again have B1 º B1 [y º y.
If I2(y) 6= ;, then we must have xB » B1 = sup(B1). Thus, y = 2 Ct
xB(B1) = Ct
xB(A). It
follows that UC(B) = u(xB) = U(B). Now consider I2(y) 6= ; and y Â B1. This implies
that y º B1 [ y º B1. Consider the two possible cases (i) y = xB, (ii) y Â xB » B1. In
the former case, the Linear Aggregation Axiom implies that §y 6µ B1. Thus, there is some
xy 2 AnB1 such that y Â xy and y 2 Cxy(A). It follows that u(y) = UC(B) ¸ U(B) = u(y).
Thus, UC(B) = U(B). Note that we have y 2 Cx(A) if and only if x 2 §y. If y Â xB, then
xB ÂB y. I wish to claim that §z µ B. Let B0 := [xºBy IB(x) and note that sup(§z) 2 B0.
Now note that (towards contradiction) if §z 6µ B0, then there is some xi 2 (AnB) \ §y
such that B0 µ ^ A(i) [ y. By de¯nition of ^ A(i) we have y » ^ A(i) [ y. Thus, u(y) =
umin(y; ^ A(i)[y) · umin(y;B0) · u(y) implying that umin(y; ^ A(i)[y) = umin(y;B0) = u(y) -
contradiction, since xB ÂB y implies u(xB) > U(B0) ¸ umin(y;B0). It follows that if y Â xB
then we must have §z µ B. Thus, 8x 2 §z;x 2 Cx(A) \ B implying that UC(B) · U(B).
Finally, note that inf(CxB(A) \ B) = xB so that UC(B) ¸ U(B).
Step 4: Induction.
Let B = B1[fy1;:::;ykg where yi 2 XnA (choose the labeling so that yi Â yi+1). We check
by induction on k that UC(B) = U(B). As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, break the argument
into three cases. Let xB denote the equivalent for B. The forthcoming arguments closely
parallel the proof of Theorem 3.1, with exceptions made for the possibility that y 2 XnA
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Case 1: xB Â y1.
Note that, since Ct
xB(A) = Ct
xB(B1), we must have yi = 2 CxB(A) so that UC(B) ¸ U(B). To
show the reverse inequality break into two-subcases.
Sub-case (i): fy1;:::;ykg 6µ B¤.
Put B(i) = Bnyi and note that B » B(i) for some i. It follows that U(B) = U(B(i)) =
UC(B(i)), by the induction hypothesis. Also, note that UC(B(i)) ¸ UC(B) since UC(B(i)) =
u(xB) > u(yi).
Sub-case (ii): fy1;:::;ykg µ B¤.
This part follows the corresponding argument for Theorem 3.1 verbatim, hence we refer the
reader to that portion of the proof noting that the argument goes through if we use Weak
Consistency instead of Consistency.
Case 2: xB = y1.
If I1(y1) 6= ;, then the argument in the text for Theorem 3.1 applies verbatim, hence
we only deal with the case where I2(y1) 6= ;. Put B0
2 := fy 2 B : I1(y) 6= ;g and set
B0
1 := fx 2 B1 : y 2 Ct
x(A)g. Letting B0 = B0
1 [B0
2 consider the menu ^ B := BnB0 and note
that y1 = sup( ^ B). Moreover, j ^ B \ fy1;:::;ykgj < k so that by the induction hypothesis
we get U( ^ B) = UC( ^ B). Moreover, U(B) = U( ^ B) (by Axiom 1¤) so that U(B) = UC( ^ B).
Since B0 is saturated and for each x 2 B0
1 we have Ct
x(A) \ fy2;:::;ykg 6= ; it follows that
UC( ^ B) ¸ UC(B). Thus, U(B) ¸ UC(B). To show the reverse inequality, note that since
y1 » B there must be some x 2 A (by the Temptation Aggregation Axiom) such that
x = 2 [yi:i¸2 (§yi [ §(yi). Thus, minz2Cx(A)\B u(z) = u(y1) so that UC(B) ¸ u(y1) = U(B).
This argument presumes that B0 6= ;. In the case where B0 = ; the induction hypothesis
does not apply. However, note that in this case the inequality UC(B) ¸ U(B) = u(y1)
follows trivially from the Temptation Aggregation Axiom. Thus, it remains to show that
U(B) ¸ UC(B). To see this note that since B0 = ; we have I2(yi) 6= ;;8yi 2 B, and more-
over, sup(B) = y1 = xB. Thus, consider the menu Bnyk and note that B » Bnyk by Axiom
1¤. By the induction hypothesis, U(Bnyk) = UC(Bnyk). Moreover, UC(Bnyk) ¸ UC(B) (to
see this note that yk 2 Cx(A) only when yk Â x, and inf(B2 \ Cx(A)) = yk for all such x).
Thus, we obtain U(B) ¸ UC(B).
Case 3: y1 Â xB.
As before consider separately the cases where I1(y1) 6= ; and I2(y) 6= ;. In either case, note
that the assumption implies that B¤ µ Bny1. Now assume that I1(y1) 6= ; and note that
the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1 applies verbatim. In particular, since y1 ÂB xB
we may check that for every xi 2 §(y1) we have yj 2 Cxi(A) (this requires only Weak
Consistency). Thus, UC(B) = UC(Bny1). Applying the induction hypothesis and Strong
Reduction gives UC(Bny1) = U(Bny1) = U(B). Now consider I2(y1) 6= ;. Observe that
for each x 2 B \ A with x Â y1 we must have x »B yi for some yi with xB º yi. By
Strong Reduction, we have B » Bnfx 2 A \ B : x Â y1g := B(1). Note that, by Weak
35Consistency, for each x 2 fx 2 A \ B : x Â y1g we have inf(IB(x)) 2 fyi : xB º yig. Thus,
by now familiar arguments yi 2 Cx(A) for each such x. It follows that UC(B(1)) = UC(B).
The remainder of the argument breaks into two sub-cases.
Sub-case (i): fy2;:::;ykg 6µ B(1)¤.
Say that yi = 2 B(1)¤. Note that in this case we have U(B(1)) = U(B(1)ny1) = U(B(1)nyi)
by Strong Reduction. I claim that UC(B(1)) · maxfUC(B(1)ny1);UC(B(1)nyi)g. To see
this consider § := fx : minCx(A)\B(1) u(z) = UC(B(1))g. If there is some x 2 § such that
y1;yj = 2 Cx(A)\B(1), then minCx(A)\(B(1)ny1) u(z) = minCx(A)\(B(1)nyj) u(z) = UC(B(1)). Oth-
erwise, for each x 2 § we have fy1;yjg\(Cx(A)\B) 6= ;. If UC(B(1)) · u(yj), then clearly
UC(B(1)) · UC(B(1)nyj). If u(yj) < UC(B(1)) < u(y1), then UC(B(1)) · UC(B(1)ny1).
Thus, in all cases UC(B(1)) · maxfUC(B(1)ny1);UC(B(1)nyi)g. By the induction hypothe-
sis, UC((B(1)ny1)sat) = U((B(1)ny1)sat) and UC((B(1)nyi)sat) = U((B(1)nyi)sat). By Claim
5.4, this then implies that UC(B(1)ny1) = U(B(1)) = UC(B(1)nyi) so that UC(B(1)) ·
U(B(1)). Since UC(B(1)) = UC(B) and U(B) = U(B(1)) we have UC(B) · U(B).
Sub-case (ii): fy2;:::;ykg µ B(1)¤.
In this case (and only in this case) we need the full force of the Temptation Aggregation
Axiom. If §y1 6µ [yi:y1Âyi (§yi [ §(yi)), then by the Aggregation Axiom we have y1 » B1
- contradiction. Thus, UC(B(1)) = UC(B(1)ny1) = UC((B(1)ny1)sat) = U((B(1)ny1)sat) =
U(B(1)ny1) = U(B(1)).
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